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INTRODUCTION

Advances in transportation and communications technology have
changed the nature of international trade and contributed to the
creation of a unified, global, and free market economy. In accordance with the reduction of government-imposed barriers to the free
trade of goods,' nations are preparing for the free trade of services,
particularly international air service.2 Free trade in the air transport
industry increases competition,3 which yields lower fares4 and creates

1. See Daniel M. Kasper, BA-USAir: Network Effects and Other Public Policy Considerations, Address Before the American Enterprise Institute, Trade Policy Forum 1 (Sept. 1992) (on
file with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter Kasper, BA-USAir] (noting that since
end of World War II, United States has tried to eliminate barriers to free trade of goods,
services, and capital in world economy); see alsoHELEN HUTCHESON, VOCABULARY OF FREE TRADE
103 (1991) (defining free trade as "trade which is unfettered by government-imposed trade
restrictions or distortion").
2. SeeJames Ott, Analysts Call Consolidationa Threat to Weak Carriers,AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TcH., Feb. 26, 1990, at 64, 64-65 (paraphrasing former Transportation Secretary Skinner's
statement suggesting that United States consider new ways to promote free trade in international
air service).
3. See THE NAT'L COMM'N TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUS., CHANGE,
CHALLENGE, AND COMPETITION: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 1 (1993)
[hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT] (concluding from its study that airline industry is
more competitive today than before 1978 due to deregulation).
4. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING
FINANCIAL AND COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 1, 3-4 (1993) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION] (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation
Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division) (concluding from study
that lack of competition leads to higher air fares for consumers); see alsoNATIONAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (concluding that airlines charge passengers and shippers lower fhres
in real dollars than they did before deregulation in 1978). The Commission determined that
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better service for airline passengers. 5
The 1919 Paris Convention and the 1944 Chicago Convention
established the principle that every nation has "complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."' Many
countries own, subsidize, or control their national airlines 7 and are
reluctant to open their domestic commercial air routes to foreign
competition.' Some nations, however, have began to privatize their
national airlines9 and liberalize" their air transport markets.
Similarly, the United States deregulated its domestic aviation market
in the late 1970s to promote competition 2 and, ultimately, to

"there is more head-to-head, city-pair competition" in the airline industry today than before
deregulation. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.

5. See United States-Benelux Low-Fare Proceeding, CAB. Order No. 78-6-97, at 5 (1978)
(stating that Civil Aeronautics Board's policy was to develop domestic and international air
transportation system based on competition to improve quality and price of air service). Alfred
"
Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, opined that the [e]ssential components
of this policy [to develop an air transportation system] are greater competitive opportunities for
airlines and the promotion of low-fare transportation options for travelers and shippers." Id.;
see also NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (suggesting that DOT continue to
grant certificates to new air carrier applicants because entry of new air carriers creates downward
pressure on fares, lowers traveling expenses, and leads to overall increase in airline traffic). See
generally Paul S. Dempsey, The InternationalRate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Passenger
Transportation,17 COLuM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393, 441 (1978) (positing that increased competition
among air carriers leads to proliferation of services for airline passengers at competitive prices,
and that price elasticity of passenger market increases air carrier's capacity, resulting in increased
revenues); Robert M. Hardaway, TransportationDeregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14
TRANsP. LJ. 101, 105 (1985) (noting that after deregulation, air safety records improved, air
fares decreased, and more carriers entered air transport market).
6. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, 61 Stat 1180, 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, 296 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]; Convention for the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, art. 1, 11 L.N.T.S. 173, 190 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; see infra
part LA. (discussing Paris and Chicago Conventions).
7. Paul S. Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies"." The Deregulation of InternationalAir
Transpor 15 TRANSP. LJ. 305, 362 (1987) [hereinafter Dempsey, Turbulence].
8. Id. Many nations control foreign air carriers not to maximize profits, but to enhance
national prestige, national security, tourism, or earn foreign exchange. Id. at 362-63.
9.

See PAUL S. DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POtICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 83 (1987)

[hereinafter DEMPSEY, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION] (noting that many European states have
partially or wholly privatized their national airlines). For example, British Airways has been
completely privatized and the Dutch government holds only a small percentage (38.2%) of KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines. Id.
10. Liberalization is defined as "the reduction of constraints imposed upon the existing
actors in the marketplace, the incumbent national airlines." Reports of Conferences, 12 AIR L. 303,
306 (1987). Deregulation, by comparison, is defined as "the abolition of all restrictions
dominating the air traffic marketplace, thus providing free access to international air transport."
Id.
11. See, e.g., infra part II.B.2. (discussing liberalization of air transport policies among EC
member states).
12. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (describing congressional intent and
purpose of Airline Deregulation Act of 1978); see also Kasper, BA-USAir, supra note 1, at 1
(claiming that deregulation of U.S. domestic air services industry created new market
opportunities rather than new restrictions).
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provide better air service and lower air fares for American consum13
ers.
Through its recently defined Open Skies initiative,1 4 the United
States is seeking to export its deregulation policy to the rest of the
world. " The Open Skies policy, however, does not include provisions on liberalizing foreign investment16 or cabotage17 restrictions.
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT)
correctly determined that it did not have authority to amend the
foreign ownership and cabotage statutes through its Open Skies policy
and that only Congress has the power to legislate on these issues.1 9
Open Skies is a model set of provisions that the United States
currently uses in negotiating liberal bilateral aviation agreements with
sovereign nations. An Open Skies agreement with the United States
may provide foreign airlines with virtually unlimited access to the U.S.
market and the freedom to set fares.2" The United States recently
incorporated the elements of the Open Skies initiative into a bilateral
agreement with the Netherlands.2 Because the Netherlands had
signed an Open Skies agreement, the DOT subsequently authorized
the integration of services between the Netherlands-based KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines (KLM) and the U.S.-based Northwest Airlines,
effectively creating a global air carrier."
Since the fall of 1992, however, the United States and the United
2
Kingdom have been unable to reach an Open Skies agreement. 1

13. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 3, 92 Stat. 1705, 1705-07
(1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (1993)) (stating purpose of Deregulation Act). See
generally Alfred E. Kahn, The ChangingEnvironment of InternationalAir Commerce, 3 AIR L. 163
(1978) (discussing U.S. deregulation policy).
14. See infra text accompanying note 165 (listing elements of DOT's Open Skies policy).
15. See infra part M.A. (explaining U.S. Open Skies initiative).
16. See infra notes 222-35 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. foreign investment laws).
17. United States cabotage laws prohibit foreign air carriers from carrying local traffic on
U.S. domestic air routes. See W.M. Sheehan, Comment, Air Cabotage and the Chicago Convention,
63 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (1950) (defining cabotage as carriage of passengers or goods
between two points within territory of same nation for compensation or hire); see alsoJan Ernst
C. de Groot, CabotageLiberalization in the EuropeanEconomic Community and Article 7 of the Chicago
Convention, 14 ANNALS Am & SPACE L. 139, 140 (1989) (noting that cabotage rights, also referred
to as eighth freedom of air, have been denied or restricted to protect national airlines from
foreign competition on domestic routes).
18. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing denial of cabotage rights to
foreign air carriers).
19. Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13, at 6 (1992).
20. See infra text accompanying note 165 (listing elements of Open Skies initiative).
21. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text (discussing Open Skies agreement
between United States and the Netherlands).
22. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (describing KLM Royal Dutch AirlinesNorthwest Airlines transaction).
23. See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing Open Skies negotiations
between United States and United Kingdom).
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These negotiations for a bilateral Open Skies agreement failed
because the United Kingdom would not grant U.S. air carriers greater
access to slots' 4 in its airports,' and because the United States
would not guarantee the approval of the British Airways-USAir
transaction 6 and the revision of U.S. foreign investment" and
cabotage 8 laws. In July 1992, British Airways filed an application
with the DOT for the authority to make a substantial investment in
USAir and to enter into a code sharing agreementl with USAir that
would have effectively integrated the operations of the two airlines.30
Anticipating that the DOT would reject its application because U.S.U.K. efforts to reach an Open Skies agreement were unsuccessful,
British Airways withdrew its application from the DOT in December
1992.1
Unless Congress amends U.S. protectionist and nationalistic foreign
investment and cabotage laws, 2 the United States will be unable to
persuade many nations to liberalize their air transport regulations.
For U.S. air carriers to obtain greater access to foreign markets,
Congress must create a statutory framework that eliminates restrictions on foreign investment and cabotage rights for foreign air
carriers whose governments enter into Open Skies agreements with
the United States. Part I of this Comment traces the evolution of the

24. SeeDANIEL M. KASPER, DEREGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION: LMERALIZINGINTERNATIONAL TRADE INAIR SERVICES 68 (1988) [hereinafter KASPER, DEREGULATION] (predicting accurately
that "allocating access to take-off and landing slots" is barrier to expansion of international air
transportation).
25. See infra note 183 and accompanying text (noting that British refused to grant U.S. air
carriers greater access to Heathrow Airport).
26. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (presenting U.S. reasons for refusing support
of British Airways-USAir transaction).
27. See infra notes 222-35 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. foreign investment laws).
28. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing denial of cabotage rights to
foreign air carriers).
29. Code sharing is the practice by which airlines connect flight legs into a longer route
under one computer designator code and charge a single fare for the combined flights. See
Stanley Ziemba, British Airways-USAir Link Clearedfor Takeoff, CHI. TRIM., Mar. 16, 1993, at NI
(describing code sharing agreements). A code sharing agreement is a joint marketing
agreement, typically between a large airline and a commuter airline, that enables the commuter
airline to link passengers to longer routes. GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPEITION, supranote
4, at 11 n.20. Code sharing provides an advantage in computer reservations by linking flights
from separate airlines, creating greater customer convenience, and allowing them to book
passage on multiple airlines through a single reservation. Id. at 11 n.21.
30. USAir Group Inc., the parent corporation of USAir Inc., and British Airways entered
into an Investment Agreement that required the Department of Transportation's approval. See
infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text (discussing British Airways-USAir transactions). The
parent and subsidiary companies will be referred to interchangeably as USAir in this Comment.
31. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (discussing first attempted British AirwaysUSAir transaction).
32. See infranotes 284-98 and accompanying text (recommending measures to relax foreign
investment and cabotage restrictions).
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international aviation system and explains multilateral, bilateral, and
unilateral models of regulation. Part II describes domestic and
international efforts to deregulate and liberalize civil aviation markets
and thereby promote competition. Part III evaluates the Open Skies
initiative. Part IV analyzes attempts by the United States to restrict
foreign investment and limit cabotage rights to domestic air carriers.
Part V recommends that both the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(Federal Aviation Act)3 3 and the Open Skies initiative be amended
to eliminate restrictions on foreign ownership, foreign control, and
cabotage rights through bilateral or multilateral agreements with
other countries that provide reciprocal rights. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the United States must provide foreign air carriers with
greater access to its domestic market to encourage other nations to
liberalize their air transport policies.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
REGULATION

A.

MultilateralAgreements

1.

The Paris Convention
The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 produced the Convention for
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention), which
established and defined the legal framework for international
aviation. 4 The Paris Convention recognized that every nation has
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory 5 and set the foundation for governments to regulate air carriers operating in their
national airspace."

33. Pub. L. No. 85-726,72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988 & Supp.
11989 & Supp. II 1990)).
34. Paris Convention, supra note 6, 11 LN.T.S. at 173.
35. Paris Convention, supranote 6, art. 1, 11 L.N.T.S. at 190. The delegates to the Paris
Conference did not adopt the maritime "freedom of the seas" principle for international
aviation. See E. Tazewell Ellett, Internationaland U.S. Legal and Polity Impediments to the Growth of
the Airline Industry: Time for a Change in the World Order?, AIR & SPACE L., Winter 1991, at 3, 3
(explaining that "freedom of the seas" concept permits ships to travel oceans freely and call at
port of any country without limitations). The delegates to the Paris Conference probably
declined to adopt the "freedom of the seas" concept for international aviation because of the
airplane's effective use as a weapon in World War I and the concern that this freedom would
be abused. Id.
36. See Ellett, supra note 35, at 4 (asserting that Paris Convention recognized that role of
national governments in international aviation regulation would be more active than in other
international industries).

1993]
2.

LIBERALIZE OPEN SKES

The Chicago Convention

In 1944, the United States sponsored the Chicago International
Civil Aviation Conference (Chicago Conference),; 7 which produced
The United States endorsed a laissezthe Chicago Convention.'
faire, free-market philosophy through which all airlines would have
relatively unrestricted operating rights on international routes.3 9 To
effectuate this free-market policy, the U.S. delegation to the Chicago
Conference proposed the multilateral recognition of the five
"freedoms of the air."' The United States further contended that
market forces, rather than an international regulatory body, should
determine capacity,4 frequency,42 and fares for transcontinental

37. Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 310; see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. L. No. 2820,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, CHICAGO, ILL., Nov. 1 - DEC.
7, 1944, at 14-15 (1948) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHICAGO CONFERENCE] (indicating
that purpose of conference was to establish permanent international aeronautical body and
multilateral aviation agreement to address fields of air transport, air navigation, and other
technical aspects of aviation); see also ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY: THE PoLITCS,
CONTESTS AND CARTELS OF WORLD AILINES 66 (1984) (noting that United States invited all
members of newly formed United Nations to Conference and that Soviet Union accepted
invitation to attend but withdrewjust before Conference opened in September 1944); Michael
Milde, The Chicago Convention-After Forty Years, 9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 119, 119-20 (1984)
(stating that 52 states participated in Chicago Conference and 35 states signed Convention on
International Civil Aviation).
38. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at 295; see U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supranote 37, at 132-372 (noting that Chicago Conference also
resulted in Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, International Air Services Transit
Agreement, International Air Transport Agreement, model bilateral agreement form, and draft
of 12 technical annexes).
39. Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 311-12 (describing U.S. position as favoring airline
market driven by consumer demand rather than governmental economic regulation).
40. The "five freedoms" are terms of art commonly used in bilateral air transportation
treaties. The "five freedoms" are:
1) A civil aircraft has the right to fly over the territory of another country without
landing, provided the overflown country is notified in advance and approval is given
[first freedom].
2) A civil aircraft of one country has the right to land in another country for technical
reasons, such as refueling or maintenance, without offering any commercial service to
or from that point [second freedom].
3) An airline has the right to carry traffic from its country of registry to another
country [third freedom].
4) An airline has the right to carry traffic from another country to its own country of
registry [fourth freedom].
5) An airline has the right to carry traffic between two countries outside its own
country of registry as long as the flight originates or terminates in its own country of
registry [fifth freedom].
Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 311 n.12.
41. See Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 312 n.14 (defining capacity as total number
of available commercial seats on specific type of aircraft multiplied by flight frequency of that
aircraft during specific time period over specific route).
42. See Dempsey, Turbulene supra note 7, at 312 n.15 (defining frequency as "number of
flights during a specific time period (usually one week) over a specific route").
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routes.4 3 The British delegation, however, endorsed the establishment of an international regulatory body, the "International Air
Authority," to coordinate air transport, apportion the world's air
routes, and establish frequencies and tariffs to avoid wasteful
competition.'4 Neither the U.S. nor the British proposal received
significant support, and the participants at the Chicago Conference
rejected both theories.45
Although the Chicago Conference failed to create an international
economic regulatory body or arrange a multilateral exchange of
traffic rights,' it did produce several notable accomplishments.
First, the Chicago Conference established the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), 4' which was formally organized in
1947 to regulate safety, communications, and technological aspects of
international civil aviation.4'
Second, the Chicago Convention
reaffirmed the principle originally articulated at the Paris Conven-

43. Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 311-12 (describing U.S. promotion of free-market
principles that would allow relatively unrestricted operation rights on international flights).
44. Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 312 n.18.
45. Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 312 n.19. Participants of the Chicago Conference
generally opposed the multilateral granting of the "five freedoms" with no capacity or frequency
restrictions because they believed that such a system would confer upon the United States a
near-monopoly on international routes. Id.; see also Bruce Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The
ProspectsforFurtherLiberalizationof Trade in InternationalAir TransportServices, 57J. AIR L & COM.
599, 604 (1992) (noting that delegates to Chicago Conference thought that creation of
international authority to regulate international air transport was impractical).
46. Dempsey, Turbulence, supra note 7, at 311.
47. See Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 44, 61 Stat. at 1192-93, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326
(setting forth objectives of ICAO). Article 44 of the Chicago Convention provides:
The aims and objectives of the Organisation are to develop the principles and
techniques of air navigation and to foster the planning and development of
international air transport so as to:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout
the world;
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities
for international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and
economical air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
(f)Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every
contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil
aeronautics.
Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 44, 61 Stat. at 1192-93, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326.
48. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 44, 61 Stat. at 1192-93, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326; see
Milde, supra note 37, at 119, 122 (noting that Chicago Convention established ICAO as
"international organization with wide quasi-legislative and executive powers in the technical
regulatory field and with only consultative and advisory functions in the economic sphere").
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tion49 that nations have sovereignty over the airspace above their
territory.'
This concept of sovereignty over national airspace
precipitated the development of a bilateral system in which airlines
rely on bilateral air transport agreements to determine international
airline routes, frequency, and capacity.-'
B.
1.

BilateralAgreements

Bermuda I

Governments of sovereign nations5 2 negotiate bilateral air transport agreements to regulate air transport services between" and
sometimes beyond their territories."' Bilateral agreements also serve

49. See supratext accompanying note 35 (indicating Paris Convention's position on airspace
sovereignty).
50. See Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 1, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at 296
(providing that "[t]he contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory"). Article 6 of the Convention provides that
"[n]o scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and
in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization." Id. art. 6, 61 Stat. at 1182,
15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
51. See PETER HAANAPPEL, PRICING AND CAPACITY DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 17-18 (1984) (noting that model bilateral agreement called "Form of Standard
Agreement for Provisional Air Routes" was drafted at Chicago Conference); Henri A.
Wassenbergh, Parallelsand Diffrnces in the Development ofAir, Sea, and Space Law in the Light of
Grotius'Heritage,9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 163, 171 n.16 (1984) (stating that "Article 6 of the
Chicago Convention has become the starting point for the present restrictive bilateralism in the
exchange of operational and traffic rights for international scheduled air services"); see also
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 3, at 20 (noting that Chicago Conference created
bilateral agreement system that resulted in more than 1200 bilateral agreements in last 50 years).
The United States used the model developed at the Chicago Conference as a guide to negotiate
bilateral agreements with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and Switzerland. HAANAPPEL, supra.
52. See P.P.C. Haanappel, BilateralAir TransportAgreements-1913-1980, 5 INT'L TRADE UJ.
241, 241 (1980) (observing that bilateral air transport agreements become effective after both
nations ratify agreement). Bilateral agreements are made by executive agreements, treaties, or
an exchange of diplomatic notes. Id. at 263-64. In the United States, bilateral air transport
agreements are executive agreements signed by the President and do not require ratification by
the Senate. Id.; see alsoJoseph Z. Gertler, Self-Enforcement ofBilateralAir TransportAgreements, 14
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L 113, 116 (1989) (noting that bilateral air transport agreements are
essentially reciprocal exchanges of "permissions" or "authorizations" to promote international
air services between two contracting parties).
53. Haanappel, supra note 52, at 241 (noting that bilateral agreements typically do not
include provisions regarding non-scheduled or chartered flights, but that some recent bilateral
agreements include regulations for chartered air transport services).
54. The description of air transport services "beyond their territories" refers to fifth-freedom
rights that governments often exchange in bilateral agreements. Haanappel, supra note 52, at
241. For example, country A may allow an airline registered in country B to pick up passengers,
mail, and cargo in country A and to continue the flight to country C, provided that the flight
originated in country B. In return, country B would grant the same privilege, or fifth-freedom
right, to airlines registered in country A. Id. at 305; see Ralph Azzie, Spectfir Problems Solved by the
Negotiation of BilateralAir Agreements, 13 MCGILL LJ. 303, 305 (1967) (describing agreement
between Canada and France giving Canada air traffic rights between Paris and other European

286

THE AMERICAN UNwERSriY LAW REVW

[Vol. 43:277

as vehicles for harmonizing the domestic aviation rules of the
participating countries and for establishing guidelines for government
regulation of international air services.5 5 In 1946, the United States
and the United Kingdom signed a bilateral air transport agreement,
which is commonly known as Bermuda 1.56 For the next thirty years,
Bermuda I served as a model for the United States and other nations
negotiating bilateral air transport agreements.57
Bermuda I represented a compromise between the liberal American
and the restrictive British ideologies that had conflicted at the
Chicago Conference.5 8 The United States agreed that the International Air Transport Association (IATA), founded in 1945, 59 would

have primary responsibility for establishing fares on international
routes, subject to the approval of the governments affected by IATA
fare decisions.' ° In return, the United Kingdom allowed airlines the
freedom to determine capacity and frequency of service.6 '
2.

Bermuda I1

In 1976, the United Kingdom terminated Bermuda I and negotiated a more restrictive agreement with the United States, commonly

cities); see also supranote 40 (defining fifth-freedom rights).
55. Gertler, supranote 52, at 116 (describing bilateral agreements as reciprocal authorizations that govern aviation operations between two countries).
56. Agreement on Air Services, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K, 60 Stat. 1499, 1499 [hereinafter
Bermuda I].
57. See Dempsey, Turbulence,supra note 7, at 316 (noting that United States signed bilateral
agreements similar to Bermuda I with almost seventy-five countries); see also Haanappel, supra
note 51, at 243 (stating that Bermuda I remained in effect until 1977 when it was replaced by
Bermuda I).
58. Dempsey, Turbulence,supranote 7, at 315 (attributing compromise to bargaining power
of both countries). At the time of these negotiations, Britain had a vast empire with landing
areas around the globe, and the United States led the world in aviation technology and
production. Id.; see also Haanappel, supra note 52, at 243 (stating that United Kingdom
advocated highly regulated civil aviation structure at Chicago Conference). The United
Kingdom wanted to ensure its "fair share" of the international market because the majority of
its air fleet had been destroyed in World War Hi. Haanappel, supra note 52, at 243. Conversely,
the U.S. air fleet was still large after the war, and the United States thus supported a system of
free competition. Id.
59. Dempsey, Turbulence, supra note 7, at 315.
60. Bermuda 1, supra note 56, annex II, 60 Stat. at 1505 (providing that if government
opposed fare set by IATA, it could bargain to achieve acceptable fare); see Dempsey, Turbulence
supranote 7, at 347 n.146 (explaining that IATA organizes conferences for airlines to coordinate
international tariffs).
61. Bermuda I, supranote 56, annex IV, 60 Stalt. at 1510-11. The decisions on capacity and
frequency were subject to ex post review by the governments according to the general principle
that air services should be closely related to traffic demand. Id. at 1515. Bermuda I also
contained several important provisions relating to fifth-freedom traffic rights. I. For example,
a designated national carrier had discretion to adopt designated fifth-freedom limitations subject
to the general principle that air services should be closely related to demand. Haanappel, supra
note 52, at 250.
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referred to as Bermuda II, that became effective in 1977.62 Bermuda

II restricted capacity, significantly reduced U.S. air carriers' fifthfreedom rights,63 and added provisions concerning international
charter air services.' 4 The United States and the United Kingdom
expected Bermuda II to replace Bermuda I as the world model for
bilateral air transport agreements.' Bermuda II, however, was not
very influential in the international arena. First, Bermuda II dealt
with issues specifically related to the United States-United Kingdom
relationship.' Second, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United
States liberalized its international aviation policy and moved away
from the restrictive policies set forth in Bermuda ll.67 A modified,
highly restrictive version of Bermuda II, however, currently regulates
the civil aviation relationship between the United States and the
United Kingdom.'
C. UnilateralRegulation: U.S. Domestic Policy

The United States first created a definite civil aviation policy in
1926 when Congress passed the Air Commerce Act.69 Congress then
passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Civil Aeronautics Act),7
which reaffirmed the Air Commerce Act?1 and expanded civil
aviation policy.72 The Civil Aeronautics Act created the Civil
Aeronautics Authority,7" which was reorganized and redesignated as

62,

Agreement on Air Services, July 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 5367, 5367 (hereinafter

Bermuda II].
63. L. Gilles Sion, MultilateralAirTransportAgreementsReconsidere& ThePossibilityof a Regional
Agreement Among North Atlantic States, 22 VA.J. INT'L L. 155, 164 (1981).
64. Bermuda II, supranote 62, art. 14, 28 U.S.T. at 5381.
65. Haanappel, supra note 52, at 261.
66. Haanappel, supra note 52, at 261 (stating that Bermuda II was very detailed and
therefore was not good model for other countries to follow).
67. See Haanappel, supra note 52, at 261 (attributing change in policy to Carter
administration's belief that government participation in economic regulation should be minimal,
leaving economic decisions and policies to discretion of individual airlines).
68. See Kasper, BA-USAir, supra note 1, at 1 (noting history of British protectionism and
claiming that Bermuda H1agreement limits competition, leads to increased air fares, restricts
capacity, and prevents airlines from providing nonstop flights between more U.S. and U.K.
points); see also GAO REPORT ON AHRlINE COMPETmON, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that United
States currently has 72 bilateral air transport agreements with 95 countries world wide).
69. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568; JOHN C. COOPER, THE
RIGHT TO FLY 138 (1947).
70. Pub. L No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 130 11542 (1988 & Supp. 11989 & Supp. I11990)). In 1958, Congress amended the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 with the Federal Aviation Act. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72
Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988 & Supp. MI 1991)).
71. COOPER, supranote 69, at 145.
72. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub L. No. 75-706, § 2, 52 Stat 973, 980; see infra note
79 and accompanying text (relating congressional civil aviation policy).
73. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 2, 52 Stat at 980.
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the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1939, 74 to regulate the
economic growth of the U.S. airline industry.75 The Civil Aeronautics Act provided a framework for regulating three aspects of the
aviation industry: (1) market entry and exit, including the CAB's
power to grant operating permits and to approve, allocate, and assign
routes and service to certain communities;76 (2) rates and air
fares; 77 and (3) anticompetitive practices. 78 To implement the Civil
Aeronautics Act, Congress authorized the CAB to publish and
interpret regulations consistent with the statutory mandate and
congressional intent.79

74. Reorganization Plan No. IV, § 7, 54 Stat. 1234, 1235 (1940) (merging Civil Aeronautics
Authority and Air Safety Board into new body, Civil Aeronautics Board); see Paul S. Dempsey,
The Rise and Fallof the Civil Aeronautics Board: Opening Wide the loodgates ofEntry, 11 TRANSP. U.J.
91, 93 (1979) (stating that President Roosevelt signed Civil Aeronautics Act to establish CAB "as
an independent regulatory agency designed to provide classic public utility type regulation over
the air transportation industry, then deemed to be in its infancy"). Congress abolished the CAB
on December 31, 1984 and transferred some of its duties to the DOT. See 49 U.S.C. app. §
1551(b) (1988) (transferring to DOT CAB's authority to provide compensation for air
transportation to small communities and all of CAB's powers regarding foreign air transportation).
75. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 2, 52 Stat. at 980 (assigning to CAB role of
restricting issuance of new airline routes and controlling market entry through airline licensing
system according to "public convenience and necessity"); Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at
319 (noting that legislative history of Civil Aeronautics Act indicates congressional belief that air
transport industry, which was in its "infancy," needed regulation for its sound development as
if it were public utility); see also Jeffrey S. Heuer & Musette H. Vogel, Airlines in the Wake of
Deregulation:Bankruptcy as an Alternative to Economic Deregulation, 19 TRANSP. LJ. 247, 249 (1991)
(stating that Congress feared that without regulation, air transportation industry would end up
like railroads and motor carriers of late 19th and early 20th centuries when competitors in those
industries priced each other out of markets, leaving monopolies to charge unreasonably high
prices).
76. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 401, 52 Stat. at 987.
77. Id. § 1002(d), 52 Stat. at 1018-19.
78. Id. § 408(a), 52 Stat. at 1000-02.
79. The congressional policy statement provides:
In the exercise and performance of its power and duties under this Act, the Authority
shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and
in accordance with the public convenience and necessity (a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve
the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound
economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between,
and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an airtransportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its development and safety, and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
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Between 1938 and 1976, the CAB rigidly regulated the airline
industry by restricting market entry and constraining the innovation
of service alternatives."0 These policies contributed to the lack of
competitive pricing in the industry and ultimately caused U.S. airlines
to become less profitable.8 In 1975, the CAB responded to these
problems by reexamining its policies and recommending that
Congress deregulate the air transport industry. 2
II.

A.

LIBERALIZATION

United States Deregulation and LiberalizationPolicy

In response to the CAB's recommendation to deregulate the air
transport industry, and following extensive congressional hearings on
aviation regulatory reform, 3 Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (Airline Deregulation Act).s The Airline Deregulation Act eased restrictions on pricing, market entry, and routes to
promote competition.' The goal of this policy was to ensure that
airline service was reasonably priced and available to a greater

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 2, 52 Stat. at 980.
80. See Heuer & Vogel, supra note 75, at 252 (observing that CAB's de jure policy of
denying certification requests to new carriers led to shortage of new carriers entering market,
lack of price competition, higher rates and fares, inefficiency, and over time stagnation).
81. See Herbert D. Kelleher, Dergulationand the Troglodytes-Hourthe Airlines Met Adam Smith,
50J. AIR L. & COM. 299, 301 n.ll (1985) (stating that regulation led to high costs and prices,
weakened carriers' ability to respond to market demands, and narrowed range of prices and
quality of services available to consumers); see also Heuer & Vogel, supra note 75, at 252 (stating
that CAB's regulatory policy was effective when first instituted because economy was strong and
growing but was not appropriate in 1970s when economy was weak).
82. See Kelleher, supranote 81, at 301 n.11 (concluding that airline industry was "naturally
competitive, not monopolistic") (quoting CIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT OF THE CAB
SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY REFORM 1 (1975)).
83. See, e.g., Aviation Regulatoy Reform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on PublicWorks and Transportation,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings
on Aviation Regulatoy Reform] (testimony ofJohn E. Robson, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board)
(weighing costs and benefits of, and supporting, airline deregulation); Oversight of Civil
Aeronautics Board PracticesandProcedures: Senate Subcomm. on AdministrativePracticeand Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, 56-66 (1975) (testimony ofJames C.
Miller, Senior Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisors) (examining deregulation of
airline industry).
84. Pub. L No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§
1301-1542 (1988 & Supp. m11991)).
85. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1704, 1705 (1978)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988 & Supp. Il (1991)). In addition,
the Airline Deregulation Act guaranteed essential air service to small communities through
federal subsidies of unprofitable operations and restrictions against market exit. Id. § 419, 92
Stat. at 1733-34 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (1988 & Supp. 111 (1991)). The
Airline Deregulation Act prevented the CAB and any successor to its authority from regulating
reasonable fares. It.§ 37, 92 Stat. at 1741-42 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1492 (1988)).
It also prevented unlawful consolidations and mergers in the industry. Id. § 408, 92 Stat. at 1726
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1988)).
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percentage of the American public.8"
Following passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, the United States
negotiated liberal bilateral air transport agreements8 7 and attempted
to persuade other nations to open their air transport markets. 88 To
deregulate international routes, the United States entered into eleven
liberal bilateral air transport agreements, or amendments to existing
agreements, between 1978 and 1980.89 The U.S. policy of promoting
liberalization was moderately successful in northern Europe, but did
not have significant effects on air transport agreements in southern
Europe, Asia, or Latin America.'o
The Bush administration also promoted competition by pursuing
the international Open Skies concept originally proposed by the

86. See Hearings on Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 83, at 62 (testimony of John E.
Robson, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board) (indicating that goal of deregulation was to create
system that would maximize efficiency, create fares reflecting those efficiencies, allow air carrier
management to pursue pricing, service and marketing innovations, allow for air carrier
profitability, and maintain adequate air service to meet America's needs).
87. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (listing newly negotiated liberal bilateral
agreements and characteristics each agreement has shared).
88. The rationale behind the U.S. policy of liberalizing international air transportation was
described by the CAB:
The policy of our government is to trade liberalizations rather than restrictions ....
The underlying premise is that expansion of competitive opportunities for all carriersforeign as well as U.S.-benefits everyone, particularly the consumer. This has been the
domestic experience, and it is equally applicable internationally, if governments will
allow.
World Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. 78-9-2, at 6 (1978).
89. Haanappel, supra note 52, at 261-62 (noting that liberal bilateral air transport
agreements were reached with Australia, Belgium, Fiji, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Israel,
Jamaica, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, and Singapore). These new bilateral agreements
generally contained the following characteristics: "pricing flexibility, unrestricted capacity,
multiple designations [of airlines], access to interior U.S. markets for foreign flag carriers, some
new fifth-freedom rights for U.S.-flag carriers, country of origin charter rules, and elimination
of discrimination and unfair methods of competition." DEMPSEY, INTERNATIONALAVIATION, supra
note 9, at 35.
90. See MELVIN A. BRENNER ET AL, AiRLINE DEREGULATION 13, 106-07 (1985) (discussing
results of U.S. efforts to promote international liberalization of air transportation). Northern
European nations accepted liberal bilateral agreements because the region already had
widespread competition in air service and fares. Id. at 106. Several European governments
believed that the cost of increased competition with U.S. airlines would be outweighed by the
gains from increased access to the U.S. market. Id. South American governments rejected the
"Open Skies" ideology, fearing that their national carriers would be overrun by U.S. airlines.
Id. In the Far East, South Korea, Singapore, and the Republic of China were willing to move
towards more liberal agreements to assist their rapidly growing airline industries. Id. at 15.
Japan was willing to accept more service from the United States, but refused to abandon its
traditionally restrictive civil aviation policies. Id. at 107.
Foreign governments characterized the Carter administration's policy to extend liberalization
internationally as "undiplomatic at best, and patronizing, condescending, and grossly naive at
worst." DEMPSEY, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 9, at 383-84. United States airlines also
criticized Carter's policy because they objected to the U.S. Government's trading of "hard" rights
(landing rights at major U.S. interior markets) for "soft" rights (liberalized pricing policies and
prohibitions against discrimination and unfair competitive prices). Id. at 383-84.
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United States at the 1944 Chicago Conference. 91 In 1990, the DOT
implemented the Cities Program to further the Bush administration's
policy of striving to increase the number of U.S. airports providing air
service to foreign destinations.'
Under the Cities Program, the
DOT granted eligible foreign air carriers access to additional U.S.
communities. 3 In its final order approving the Cities Program, the
DOT stated that this program would supplement rather than replace
the bilateral negotiation procedures that enable U.S. air carriers and
communities to obtain new international routes. 4
In furtherance of its international Open Skies policy, the United
States proposed plans to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
to establish aviation regimes and routes of operation unrestricted by

91. Ellett, supranote 35, at 8.
92. Expanding International Air Service Opportunities to More U.S. Cities, 55 Fed. Reg.
4039 (Dep't Transp. 1990), as amended by Expanding Int'l Air Serv. Opportunities to More U.S.
Cities, D.O.T. Order No. 91-11-26, at 1 (1991) (establishing framework for Cities Program).
93. Expandinglnt'lAir Serv. Opportunities to More U.S. Cities, D.O.T. Order No. 91-11-26,
at 1-2 (1991). The DOT originally set forth the requirements of this program as follows:
[T] he Department will approve a foreign carrier's application for a one-year, renewable
exemption authority to provide scheduled combination nonstop international air
service, or one-stop single-plane international air service via another U.S. point,
between its homeland and a U.S. community provided that:
(1) a U.S. or foreign carrier does not provide nonstop or one-stop single-plane
international air service to that community from the same foreign country;,
(2) there is a procompetitive agreement in place with the [applicant's] homeland
country and thus a basis does not exist for a traditional aviation trade to obtain
benefits for U.S. airlines;
(3) the foreign carrier's proposal does not involve service to and from third countries;
(4) interested U.S. parties have not raised overriding public interest reasons for
denying requested authority;,
(5) the foreign carrier has firm plans to operate the proposed service; and
(6) the foreign carrier meets all other applicable licensing standards.
If the foreign carrier has not inaugurated such service within 90 days or suspends such
service for more than nine months, the authority would expire by its terms without
prejudice to any subsequent application for the same authority.
Expanding International Air Service Opportunities to More U.S. Cities, 55 Fed. Reg. 4039; see
Expanding Int'l Air Serv. Opportunities to More U.S. Cities, D.O.T. Order No. 91-11-26, at 4
(1991) (reviewing original requirements of Cities Program).
The DOT amended the Cities Program to reflect: (1) that existing U.S. carrier one-stop
service would not bar a foreign carrier's request to provide nonstop service under the program;
and (2) that to be able to block approval of a foreign carrier's application, a U.S. carrier's
nonstop service must be in "same city-pair, not to/from another point in same foreign country."
Expanding Int'l Air Serv. Opportunities to More U.S. Cities, D.O.T. Order No. 91-11-26, at 1-2
(1991).
94. Expanding Int'l Air Serv. Opportunities to More U.S. Cities, D.O.T. Order No. 91-11-26,
at 2 (observing that unmodified program had not met public and private sector expectations
for better international service). Under the Cities Program, the DOT granted the application
of the Netherlands-based KLM Royal Dutch Airlines to engage in scheduled, combination
foreign air transportation of persons, property, and mail between Amsterdam and Detroit.
Application of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines for an Exemption under §416(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, D.O.T. Order No. 91-9-22, at 1 (1991).

THE AMERICAN UN1VERSrIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:277

government regulation. 5
In exchange for granting American
carriers increased access to foreign markets, the United States
proposed to allow foreign airlines access to any and all cities in the
United States. 96 The United States also offered to grant foreign and
domestic airlines permission to determine fares and schedules without
governmental approval.97 The United States hoped that by opening
these dominant markets, other nations would liberalize their air
transport policies toward the United States. 98
The U.S. initiative, however, met substantial international opposition.99 The United States had difficulty securing new, full-scale,
liberal bilateral agreements." ° France and Germany, for example,
rejected the U.S. liberalization proposals, 1 ' and the United Kingdom and many other countries are currently struggling to conclude
new bilateral agreements with the United States. 10 2 Despite these
setbacks, the United States has succeeded in negotiating new bilateral

95. Ellett, supranote 35, at 8-9 (discussing several attempts by Bush administration to attain
international Open Skies objective); see also Convene Another Chicago Convention,AVIArTON WK. &
SPACE TECH., Oct. 14, 1991, at 7, 7 (noting that U.S. rejected Open Skies proposals proffered
by Switzerland and the Netherlands in 1990, after futile attempts to secure agreements with
France, Germany, and United Kingdom).
96. Ellett, supra note 35, at 8.
97. Ellett, supra note 35, at 8 (explaining that fares and schedules could also be set to
comply with general market principles).
98. Ellett, supra note 35, at 8 (noting strategic importance of markets targeted by United
States); see also BRENNER ET AL, supra note 90 (explaining that under "encirclement theory,"
United States hoped that securing liberal pro-competition agreements with nations such as
Belgium and the Netherlands would motivate United Kingdom to modify restrictive terms of
Bermuda II agreement with United States).
99. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 3, at 21 (noting that important U.S.
bilateral partners such as Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and United Kingdom have rejected
"less restrictive more competitive bilateral agreements"); James Ott, USAir/BA Pact to Spur
Alliances, AVIATON WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 22, 1993, at 32, 32 (noting that France and
Germany oppose U.S. liberalization efforts and seek to replace current bilateral agreements with
capacity-restricting agreements).
100. See Stockfish, supranote 45, at 618 (attributing failure to conclude new agreements to
lack of compatible partners and international resistance to U.S. liberalization policy); Ron Katz,
U.S. BilateralAgreements Hit Worldwide Turbulence, INT'L HERALD TiuB., June 11, 1993, (Special
Report), at II (indicating that United States is disputing bilateral agreements with France,
Germany, Canada, Japan, and Australia, and noting that France renounced its bilateral
agreement with United States in 1992). But see infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text
(explaining Open Skies agreement between United States and the Netherlands that eliminated
restrictions on routes and frequencies that U.S. airlines and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines may
serve).
101. SeeJoan M. Feldman, On HavingIt Both Ways; InternationalCivil Aviation Organization's
Colloquium on Air-TransportRegulations, 29 ArR TRANSp. WORLD 210, 213 (1992) (reporting that
Germany, France, and United Kingdom rejected U.S. terms for new bilateral agreements).
102. SeeKatz, supra note 100, at I (explaining tension between United States and its bilateral
partners); infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (explaining failure of United States and
United Kingdom to negotiate new bilateral aviation agreement).
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agreements that provide incremental liberalization.0 3
B.
1.

InternationalLiberalizationEfforts

The United Kingdom

Although the United States has been the primary advocate of
international air transport liberalization, the United Kingdom also
attempted to liberalize air transport in the 1980s. 1°4 In 1984, for
example, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands signed an
exceptionally liberal bilateral agreement that allowed their airlines to
offer discount fares."0 5 In 1985, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg concluded the first bilateral agreement to liberalize "route
access, capacity control and tariff approvals."" ° Following the lead
of the United Kingdom-Luxembourg agreement, other nations began
to enter into bilateral agreements in the late 1980s that typically
included double disapproval pricing,0 7 open market entry, and
capacity provisions."' 8

103. See Stockfish, supra note 45, at 618 (noting that since 1990, United States has concluded
new bilateral agreements with Brazil, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Soviet Union, Singapore,
Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela).
104. See New Agreements Spur European Liberalization,AVIAION WK.& SPACE TECH., Nov. 12,
1984, at 71, 71-73 (stating that United Kingdom was involved in most new liberal fare
agreements and was main proponent of lower fares). See generally Paul S. Dempsey, European
Aviation Regulation: FRying Through the LiberalizationLabyrinth, 15 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L.REV. 311,
311-33 (1992) [hereinafter Dempsey, European Aviation Regulation] (discussing liberalization
efforts in European Community).
105. See Michael Feazel, British, Dutch Aim at Deregulation,AVIATION WK.& SPACE TECH.,June
25, 1984, at 29, 29-30 (reporting that United Kingdom-Netherlands agreement gave British and
Dutch airlines authority to determine fares, capacity, schedules, and frequencies for routes
between two signatory countries).
106. STEPHEN WHEATCROFr & GEOFFREYLIPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT INA CoMPErmvE EUROPEAN
MARKET: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIES 65, 66 (1986) (indicating that "liberal
phraseology" of route access, capacity control, and tariff provisions of United KingdomLuxembourg agreement became model for United Kingdom's later bilateral agreements with
France, Belgium, and Switzerland); see Dempsey, EuropeanAviation Regulation, supranote 104, at
321 (explaining that United Kingdom-Luxembourg agreement granted unrestricted market entry
and capacity); see alsoWHEATCROFr & LPMAN, supra, at 213 (stating that under United KingdomLuxembourg agreement, one government may unilaterally reject tariff of its own airline if it
determines that fare is "predatory or excessive in relation to costs).
107. See Dempsey, European Aviation Regulation, supra note 104, at 321 (defining double
disapproval pricing as provision in bilateral treaty that allows set fares to be rejected only with
approval of both governments, and noting that United Kingdom-Luxembourg agreement
became model for later bilateral agreements).
108. Werner F. Ebke & George W. Wenglorz, LiberalizingScheduled Air Transport Within the
European Community: From the FirstPhaseto the Second and Beyond, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 417, 425 (1991)
(stating that since 1980s, United Kingdom concluded procompetitive bilateral air transport
agreements with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Federal Republic of Germany that provided for
dismantling of market access and capacity restrictions); see also New Agreements Spur European
Liberalization,supra note 104, at 73 (noting that after British signed 1984 agreement with the
Netherlands, other countries such as West Germany, Switzerland, France, Finland, Greece, Spain,
Italy, and Portugal signed new liberal bilateral agreements allowing discount fares).
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The European Community

In addition to U.S. initiatives and the British bilateral agreements,
the European Community made significant efforts to liberalize air
transportation. The European Community promulgated the Treaty
of Rome"° in 1957 to increase competition in various sectors of the
economy, including transportation.1
In 1979, the European
Commission produced its first air transport memorandum,1 11 which
identified the overall problems of the industry and recommended a
framework for establishing a new policy."' In 1984, the European
Commission issued a second memorandum" 3 that focused on
maintaining the bilateral agreement system and imposing gradual
reductions in capacity and tariff controls." 4 The European Council,
however, has not passed either memorandum proposed by the
European Commission. 5
The Court of Justice of the European Communities has also
become involved in the air transport liberalization effort. In 1986, the
court held in the Nouvelles Frontires"6 case that the European
Economic Community's antitrust laws" 7 applied to civil aviation
matters. 8 This decision was significant because it enabled the
European Economic Community to intervene in the civil aviation
policies of individual member states." 9 One year after the Nouvelles

109.
110.

TREATYESTABLISHINGTHE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrIY [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
See id. art. 3(e) (directing European Community to adopt common transport policy).

See generally DENNIS SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COMMON MARKET 232 (1990) (explaining

that common transport policy is necessary to enhance interstate trade).
111. Air Transport: A CommunityApproach (Memorandum of the Commission), BULL. OF
THE EUR. ECON. COMMuNiTImES 11 (Supp. 5/1979).
112. See Emily E. Tegelberg-Aberson, Freedom in European Air Transport: The Best of Both
Worlds?, 12 AIR L 282, 284 (1987) (reporting that EC Commission recommended gradual
increase of air transport competition to improve flexibility and innovation in industry); see also
SWANN, supranote 110, at 238-39 (stating that problems in European Community included high
fares, consumer dissatisfaction with availability of flights, and collusive tendencies and restriction
of free trade in services).
113. Proposal for a Council Decision on Bilateral Agreements, Arrangements, and
Memorandum of Understanding Between Member States Relating to Air Transport, 1984 O.J.
(C 182) 1.
114. Tegelberg-Aberson, supra note 112, at 285.
115. Dempsey, European Aviation Regulation, supra note 104, at 350 (noting that European
Council endorsed guidelines for further action and study on each memorandum).
116. Joined Cases 209 & 1384, Ministhre Pub. v. Lucas Asjes, 4 E.C.R. 1457, 3 C.M.LR 173
(1986) (Lux.) [hereinafter NouvellesFrontires](analyzing whether French travel agency had right
to sell airline tickets below levels agreed to in airline tariff agreement approved by member
states).
117. See EEC TREATY, supra note 109, arts. 85-86 (prohibiting monopolies and collusive
practices that prevent, restrict, or distort competition within common market).
118. NouvellesFronti'rea,4 E.C.R. at 1465-66, 3 C.M.L.R. at 215.
119. See Daniel Vincent & Dinos Stasinopoulos, The Aviation Policy of the European Community,
24 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 95, 96 (1990) (stating that Nouvelles Frontire decision and EC

1993]

LIBERALIZE OPEN SKIES

295

Frantikresdecision, the European Council passed the Single European
Act.1 20 Through this Act, which is one of the most important
agreements for the liberalization of air transportation in the European Community,121 the European Council sought to unite the
European Community by the end of 1992.122 To prepare for a
single EC air transport market, the European Council passed, in three
phases, measures to liberalize the air transportation industry. 23 In
December 1987, the European Council approved the first phase,
called the First Liberalization Package,124 which included two
Council Regulations," one Council Directive, 126 and one Council
Decision.1 27 These provisions, which pertain only to flights between
EC member states, 28 became effective on January 1, 1988." The
two Council Regulations, 3975/8713' and 3976/87,1" set forth
procedures for applying the European Community's antitrust rules to
the air transport industry, and provide exemptions from these rules
for certain agreements and practices. 132 The single Council Directive,

legislation regarding "tariffs, capacity, market access and rules of competition" provided strong
impetus for continuing liberalization of air transport in European Community).
120. Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1-29 (stating that Single European Act would
go into effectjuly 1, 1987 and that signatories to Act were committed to establishing European
internal market by Dec. 31, 1992).
121. Seeincent & Stasinopoulos, supra note 119, at 95 (observing that Single European Act
enabled EC Transport Council to create legislation that was major step toward achieving
common European transport aviation policy).
122. Vincent & Stasinopoulos, supra note 119, at 95 (noting that end of 1992 was target date
for completion of internal market).
123. Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 108, at 434-37, 441-51 (discussing provisions and
significance of tripartite liberalization package).
124. Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 108, at 434.
125. Council Regulation 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 Laying Down the Procedure for the
Application of the Rules on Competition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, 1987 O.J.
(L 374) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 3975/87]; Council Regulation 3976/87 of 14
December 1987 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Air Transport Sector, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 9
[hereinafter Council Regulation 3976/87].
126. Council Directive 87/601 of 14 December 1987 on Fares for Scheduled Air Services
Between Member States, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 12 [hereinafter Council Directive 87/601].
127. Council Decision 87/602 of 14 December 1987 on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity
Between Air Carriers on Scheduled Air Services Between Member States and on Access for Air
Carriers to Scheduled Air-Service Routes Between Member States, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 19
[hereinafter Council Decision 87/602].
128. SeeEbke &Wenglorz, supranote 108, at 434 (discussingscope offirst phase of liberalization).
129. Dempsey, EuropanAviation Regulation, supra note 104, at 539.
130. Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 125, 1987 OJ. (L 374) at 1.
131. Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 125, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 9.
132. See Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 125, art. 1, 1987 OJ. (L 374) at 2 (creating
detailed rules for applying EEC Treaty articles 85 and 86, which prohibit monopolies and
collusive practice, to air transport services); id. art. 2, 1987 OJ. (L 374) at 9-10 (noting that list
of exemptions is not exhaustive); see also Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 108, at 434-35 (discussing
antitrust regulations under first package of liberalization).
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five, 87/601,133 provides that governments must approve air fares
proposed by airlines if the fares are reasonably related to the air
carrier's costs.l"
Finally, Council Decision 87/60235 addresses capacity sharing
between air carriers on scheduled routes, and market access for air
carriers on scheduled routes between EC member states.1 3 6 Council
Decision 87/602 also enables a member state to assign multiple
airlines to a single interstate route if certain criteria are met.13 7 In
addition, the Council Decision eliminates the requirement that air
carriers share capacity equally on routes between member states.138
The First Liberalization Package, however, caused negligible effects on
competition in the European Community and resulted in only slight
reductions in air fares.13 9
In September 1989, the European Council approved the second4
phase of liberalization, consisting of three Council Regulations.' 0

133. Council Directive 87/601, supra note 126, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 12.
134. Council Directive 87/601, supra note 126, art. 3, 1987 OJ. (L 374) at 13-14 (providing
that member states are obligated to approve fares that "are reasonably related to the long-term
fully allocated costs of the applicant air carrier, while taking into account other relevant
factors"). The fact that a fare proposed by one airline is less than a fare charged by another
airline for the same route is not grounds for the government to deny approval. I. Council
Directive 87/601 also establishes two zones of flexibility for airlines to set discount and deepdiscount fares, subject to certain limitations. Id. art. 5, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 14; see also Ebke &
Wenglorz, supra note 108, at 435-36 (explaining measures to liberalize tariffs).
135. Council Decision 87/602, supranote 127, art. 1, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 20.
136. Council Decision 87/602, supranote 127, art. 1, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 20.
137. See Council Decision 87/602, supranote 127, art. 5, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 22 (permitting
more than one carrier of member state to operate on routes that carry more than 250,000
annual passengers). The threshold for number of passengers would be decreased to 200,000
in the second year, and 180,000 in the third year. Id.; see also Ebke & Wenglorz, supranote 108,
at 437 (explaining market access liberalization measures).
138. See Council Decision 87/602, supranote 127, art. 3, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 21 (replacing
traditional 50%-50% capacity-sharing rule between air carriers on intra-European routes with
graduated 55%-45%, and then 60%-40% rule). This decision also allows EC air carriers to
introduce and operate third- and fourth-freedom traffic rights for scheduled carriers on routes
between main and regional airports. Id. art. 6, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 21. Furthermore, it permits
EC air carriers to operate certain fifth-freedom routes where third- or fourth-freedom rights exist
under certain conditions. Id. art. 8, 1987 O.J. (L 374) at 22-23. Moreover, a third- or fourthfreedom carrier can combine scheduled air services by an air carrier that operates a scheduled
air service to or from two or more points in another member state or states. Id. arts. 6-8, 1987
O.J. (L 374) at 22-23; see also Ebke & Wenglorz, supranote 108, at 436-37 (explaining capacitysharing liberalization measures).
139. See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 108, at 437-38 (concluding that First Package of
Liberalization did not have noticeable effects on tariff reductions or on development of air fares,
and that competition reforms were minor because of general exemptions for EC carriers from
antitrust laws).
140. Council Regulation 2342/90 of 24Juy 1990 on Fares for Scheduled Air Services, 1990
O.J. (L 217) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 2342/90]; Council Regulation 2343/90 of 24Juy
1990 on Access for Air Carriers to Scheduled Intra-Community Air Service Routes and on the
Sharing of Passenger Capacity Between Air Carriers on Scheduled Air Services Between Member
States, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8 [hereinafter Council Regulation 2343/90]; Council Regulation
2344/90 of 24July 1990 Amending Regulation 3976/87 on the Application of Article 85(3) of
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Phase two sought to relax tariffs, capacity sharing, and market access
in preparation for phase three, which would create a unified market
for air transportation in the European Community by January 1,
1993.141 Council Regulation 2342/90" replaced Council Directive 87/601 (implemented in the first phase of liberalization)' and
Council Regulation
gave airlines greater flexibility to set fares."
2343/90" replaced Council Decision 87/602 (also implemented in
the first phase)" and further relaxed market access147 and capacity sharing regulations.'" Finally, Council Regulation 2344/90149
amended the effective dates of Council Regulation 3976/87 pertaining to the application of the European Community's antitrust rules to
The second liberalization phase
the air transport industry. 5
further prepared the European Community for the creation of a
unified market for air transport."'
In June 1992, the European Council adopted the third phase of
airline liberalization, which effectively created a single EC airline

the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Air Transport
Sector, 1990 Oj. (L 217) 15 [hereinafter Council Regulation 2344/90].
141. See Ebke & Wengorz, supra note 108, at 441-51 (discussing "Second Phase" of
liberalization of air transport in European Community). Issues such as cabotage rights,
technological improvements, and reverse discrimination of domestic carriers remained
unresolved, thus necessitating a third phase of air transport liberalization. Id. at 441-51.
142. Council Regulation 2342/90, supranote 140, 1990 O.J. (L 217) at 1.
143. Council Regulation 2342/90, supranote 140, 1990 OJ. (L 217) at 1.
144. Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 140, art. 4(3)(b), 1990 OJ. (L 217) at 3
(permitting carriers to charge 95% to 100% of reference fare for normal one-way or return
economy air fare ordinarily charged by third- or fourth-freedom air carrier on rate in question).
This regulation also narrows the discount zone from 94% to 80% of the reference fare, and
expands the deep-discount zone from 79% to 30%. Id.; see also Dempsey, European Aviation
Regulation, supra note 104, at 364 (explaining that narrowing and expanding ranges in Phase
Two allows much more pricing flexibility than Phase One).
145. Council Regulation 2343/90, supranote 140, 1990 O.J. (L 217) at 8.
146. Council Regulation 2343/90, supranote 140, 1990 Oj. (L 217) at 9.
147. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 140, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 217) at 10
(permitting EC air carriers to freely operate third- and fourth-freedom air services on any route
between any EC airport, whether hub or regional).
148. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supranote 140, arts. 8(1) (b) & 11, 1990 Oj. (L 217)
at 12-13 (expanding use of fifth-freedom service from 30% to 50% of carrier's seasonal seat
capacity, permitting member states to increase capacity share for any season by 7.5% above
previous corresponding season, and eliminating capacity limitations to services between regional
airports).
149. Council Regulation 2344/90, supra note 140, 1990 Oj. (L 217) at 15.
150. Council Regulation 2344/90, supra note 140, art. 1, 1990 OJ. (L 217) at 15 (amending
expiration date of any regulation adopted by Commission pursuant to Council Regulation
3976/87 from January 31, 1991 to December 31, 1992, changing date for revision of 3976/87
from June 30, 1990 to December 31, 1992, and revising date for Commission proposal on
3976/87 from November 1, 1989 to July 1, 1992).
151. SeeEbke & Wenglorz, supra note 108, at 419 (noting that second phase of liberalization
represents significant step toward single European market for air transport).
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market. 5 2 This initiative enables an air carrier of one EC member
state that meets certain financial and safety standards to establish
airlines in other European Community countries.'53 The third
phase also permits air carriers to set fares and rates subject to review
and disapproval by the government of a member state or the
European Commission if fares are determined to be excessively high
or low. 1 4 Cabotage is permitted, but airlines of member states have
only limited access to each other's internal air markets until April 1,
1997, when full cabotage will be permitted.'55 Before full cabotage
is allowed, air carriers are subject to two major temporary limitations:
156
(1) member states can only grant "consecutive" cabotage rights,
and (2) cabotage is limited to fifty percent of the total seasonal
capacity of any given international route. 57 In addition, EC air
Bilateral agreements,
carriers now have full fifth-freedom rights.'
capacity limitations, and national ownership rules for air carriers have
also been abrogated by the adoption of the third phase of liberalization."' In sum, the European Council's three phases of regulations
have effectively created a liberalized and single air transport market
in the European Community.

152. See Pierre Sparaco, LiberalizationCreatesEC Single Airline Marke, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 18, 1993, at 39, 39 (discussing creation of unified air transport market and noting
that air carriers of EC member states can serve all routes within 12-country market).
153. Carole A. Shifrin, ECMinistersApproveLiberalization,But 'Safeguards'MaySlow Competition,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 29, 1992, at 21, 22. To receive an operating license in a
member country, a majority of an air carrier's shares must be held and controlled by European
nationals. Id. An air carrier must also locate its headquarters in the country issuing the license,
have insurance, and meet European safety regulations. Id.
154. See id. at 21 (explaining that government of EC member state may suspend fare of
airline from another member state, and that parties can appeal decision to European
Commission).
155. Id. at 21-22 (reporting that flight origination and capacity restrictions will be lifted on
April 1, 1997).
156. Id. at 21. "Consecutive" cabotage refers to continuing flights. For example, if an air
carrier from France wants to fly between two points in Spain, the flight must originate in France.
Id.
157. Id. at 21. For example, if Iberia offers 20,000 seats on a route from Madrid to Paris
during the season, it may provide a maximum of 10,000 seats between Paris and Nice. Id.
158. Id. at 22. These fifth-freedom rights enable air carriers to operate flights in other
countries without beginning or terminating the flight in the air carrier's country of registration.
Id. at 22.
159. Sparaco, supra note 152, at 39.
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II.

A.

OPEN SKIES

The U.S. Open Skies Policy

The most recent attempt to liberalize international air transport was
the Open Skies initiative,"6° announced in March 1992 by Andrew
Card announced
H. Card, Jr., then Secretary of Transportation.
that the United States would negotiate Open Skies agreements initially
with European countries, and then with other regions of the
world1 2 willing to grant U.S. air carriers essentially free access to
After evaluating comments from various partheir markets.'
ties, " ' the DOT defined Open Skies as follows:
1) Open entry on all routes;
2) Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;
3) The right to operate between any point in the U.S. and any
point in the European country without restriction, including service
to intermediate and beyond points, and the right to transfer
passengers to an unlimited number of smaller aircraft at the
international gateway;
4) Flexibility in setting fares;
5) Liberal charter arrangements;
6) Liberal cargo arrangements;
7) The ability of carriers to convert earnings into hard currency
and return those earnings to their homelands promptly and without
restriction;
8) Open code-sharing opportunities;

160. Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13, at 1 (1992).
161. See Defining "Open Skies"; Order Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (1992)
[hereinafter Open Skies] (stating that Secretary Card's Open Skies initiative is "designed to
stimulate interest in creating an even more market-oriented international aviation environment").
162. See id. (statement of Andrew H. Card,Jr., Secretary of Transportation) ("[W]hile these
discussions were at present being confined to Europe-since Europe is moving toward the free
flow of passengers ... we hope that other regions will soon be ready to join us in similar talks.");
James Ott, More Skies To Open as U.S. Signs Pacs,AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 14,1992,
at 32, 32 (stating that Singapore, Switzerland, and Belgium are candidates for Open Skies
agreements with United States); see also How To Make the Skies a Little Friendlier: Unsuccessful
British Effort UnderscoresLarger Problem, LA. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at B4 [hereinafter Friendlier
Skies] (reporting that United States currently seeks Open Skies agreements with Japan, France,
and Germany).
163. Open Skies, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (statement of Andrew H. Card, Jr.) ("[W]e will now
offer to negotiate open skies agreements with all European countries willing to permit U.S.
carriers essentially free access to their markets.").
164. See Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13, at 1-22 (summarizing comments
filed by45 parties). Some parties supported the proposal in its entirety, some parties questioned
whether certain elements were essential, and other parties completely rejected the plan. Id.
Parties questioning the validity of the program suggested that the Open Skies initiative will
produce greater economic benefits for other nations than it will for the United States. Id. at
2.
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9) The right of a carrier to perform its own ground handling in the
other country;
10) The ability of carriers to freely enter into commercial transacdons related to their flight operations; [and]
11) A commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of and access
to computer reservation systems."
The DOT incorporated many traditional elements of a bilateral air
transport agreement into its Open Skies definition," but declined
1 67
to include provisions regarding cabotage or foreign investment.
The DOT noted that changes in the cabotage and foreign investment
statutes required legislative action" and, therefore, were outside
the scope of the Open Skies proceeding.1 9 Furthermore, the DOT
a0 case-by-case
determined that these issues were best addressed on 17
basis in the context of individual bilateral agreements.
The United States-Netherlands Open Skies Agreement
In September 1992, the United States concluded an Open Skies
agreement with the Netherlands, 7' the only air transport agreement
thus far secured under the Open Skies initiative. The goal of this
agreement is to stimulate competition in the international air
transport market with minimal government involvement. 172 Because
both parties believed that many elements of the Open Skies definition
already existed in their prior bilateral aviation agreement, 73 they
the
simply amended their existing bilateral agreement to incorporate
174
remaining elements of the DOT's Open Skies definition.
The United States-Netherlands Open Skies agreement set the
foundation for KLM Royal Dutch Airlines to integrate its operations
with Northwest Airlines'7 5 and will eventually enable these two air
B.

165. Id. at app. 1. The DOT also stated that it would include provisions on safety and
security in an Open Skies agreement. Id. at app. 1 n.1.
166. See id. (incorporating standard elements of liberal bilateral air transport agreements
such as open entry, unrestricted capacity, and flexible fares).
167. See id. at 6 (noting absence of cabotage or foreign ownership and control provisions).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Memorandum of Consultations and Amendments, Sept. 4, 1992, U.S.-Neth. 1 (on file
with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter 1992 U.S.-Netherlands Open Skies
Agreement] (amendingAir TransportAgreement, Apr. 3, 1957, U.S.-Neth., 12 U.S.T. 837,837).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. (discussing commercial airline integration agreements). The United States and
the Netherlands agreed:
(a) to give sympathetic consideration, in the context of the Open Skies agreement, to
the concept of commercial cooperation and integration of commercial operations
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carriers to operate, in effect, as a single airline. 176 In January 1993,
the DOT facilitated this integration process by granting antitrust
immunity for KLM and Northwest Airlines. 77 The airlines plan to
combine advertising and marketing efforts, coordinate the scheduling
78
of flights, and consult and cooperate on pricing.
C. United States-UnitedKingdom Open Skies Efforts
The United States has been unsuccessful in negotiating an Open
Skies agreement with the United Kingdom. 79 Until December
1992, the course of United States-United Kingdom negotiations8'
turned, in part, on the DOT's approval of British Airways' July 1992
application to invest $750 million in USAir.'' The parties failed to

between airlines of the United States and the Netherlands through commercial
agreements or arrangements, provided that such agreements or arrangements are in
conformity with the applicable antitrust and competition laws; and
(b) to provide fair and expeditious consideration to any such agreements or
arrangements filed for approval and antitrust immunity.
Id. The United States-Netherlands Open Skies Agreement does not guarantee that U.S. airlines
would be able to perform their own ground handling at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam and
does not provide a solution for the potential dilemma of limited access to certain U.S. airports.
Ott, supra note 162, at 32; see also infra text accompanying note 178 (explaining how KLM and
Northwest intend to integrate).
176. See Martha M. Hamilton, Northwest-KLMDeal Tentatively Apmved, WASH. POST, Nov. 17,
1992, at BI (noting that KLM owns 20% of common stock of NWA, Inc., Northwest's parent
company, and 10% of its voting shares); see also James T. McKenna, Northwest/KLM Package
Challenges Cometition, AviATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 15, 1993, at 31, 31 (reporting that in
1989, KIM invested $400 million in Northwest to expand international service).
177. See Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 93-1-11,
at 1 (1993) (approving and granting antitrust immunity for commercial cooperation and
integration agreement between Northwest and KLM);Acquisition ofNorthwestAirlines byWings
Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 92-11-27, at 1 (1992) (determining tentatively to grant
approval and antitrust immunity for Northwest and KLM to integrate services); see also McKenna,
supranote 176, at 31 (noting that Northwest and KLM are moving quickly to coordinate business
activities after DOT's final approval in January 1993).
178. McKenna, supra note 176, at 31 (commenting that Northwest and KLM face obstacles
in melding marketing and financing activities). As a result of this agreement, American and
Dutch consumers will be able to fly between the United States and the Netherlands from a
greater number of cities. Id.
179. At the time of publication of this Comment, the United States and the United Kingdom
still had not concluded a new bilateral agreement.
180. See FriendlierSkies, supra note 162, at B4 (stating that DOT approval of British AirwaysUSAir transaction was contingent upon United Kingdom participation in Open Skies
agreement); see also United States Department of Transportation Press Conference, FED. NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File, at 4 [hereinafter Card
Press Conference] (statement by Andrew H. Card, Jr., Secretary of Transportation) (implying
that DOT would not approve British Airways-USAir transaction unless United Kingdom gave U.S.
air carriers greater access to British airports).
181. Bill Poling, DeltaProtests BA Plan To Buy USAir Shares, TRAVEL WKLY., Aug. 6, 1992, at 3,
3 (stating that under proposed transaction, British Airways would acquire 21% of voting shares
and 44% of total equity of USAir). The proposed transaction would not violate the U.S. foreign
investment statutes, which permit foreign entities to own up to 25% of voting equity and up to
49% of total equity in U.S. airlines. See Towards Open Skies, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1992, at 14, 15
("Under the deal, BA would own just 44% of the equity and 21% of voting rights, less than the
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reach an agreement because the United Kingdom demanded approval
of the British Airways-USAir transaction and requested changes in U.S.
foreign investment and cabotage laws. 8 2 The U.S. demand for
greater U.S. air carrier access to British airports also contributed to
the failure of the negotiations." 3 Anticipating that the DOT would
reject the British Airways-USAir transaction because the United States
and the United Kingdom had not signed an Open Skies agreement,
British Airways withdrew its application to integrate its operations with
18 4

USAir.

In January 1993, British Airways announced another attempt to
invest in USAir. 85 In March 1993, however, the DOT approved
British Airways' application to invest $300 million and acquire nearly
a twenty-percent interest in USAir.'86 The DOT also granted a oneyear approval of leasing 8 7 and code sharing1" arrangements on

legal limits of 49% and 25%, respectively... ."); see also infra notes 222-35 and accompanying
text (discussing statutes limiting foreign investment and foreign control of U.S. air carriers).
In addition, British Airways would obtain four seats on USAir's 16-member board of directors
and a guarantee that no major decisions would be made without the approval of at least 80%
of the board of directors. See Towards Open Skies, supra, at 15. According to USAir's rival airlines
(Delta, United, and American), British Airways would have negative veto power and de facto
control of USAir. Id.
182. See Card Press Conference, supra note 180, at 4 (discussing major obstacles to
concluding Open Skies agreement with United Kingdom); infiranotes 201-26 and accompanying
text (discussing U.S. statutes that restrict foreign investment in U.S. airlines and prohibit foreign
air carriers from engaging in cabotage).
183. Card Press Conference, supranote 180, at 4. Former Secretary Card advocated an Open
Skies relationship with the United Kingdom that would give U.S. air carriers unrestricted access
to all airports in the United Kingdom, and the right to pick up passengers in the United
Kingdom and carry them to other countries. Id. at 5. Card indicated that the United
Kingdom's refusal to expand U.S. access to Heathrow Airport in London was a major stumbling
block for the U.S. delegation to the negotiations. Id.
184. Letter from Richard D. Matthias & FrankJ. Costello, Counsel for USAir Inc., to Jeffrey
N. Shane, Assistant Secretary for Policy & International Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation (Dec. 22,1992) (on file with The American UniversityLaw Review) (advising DOT that British
Airways had terminated plan to invest in USAir); see Card Press Conference, supranote 180, at
7 (announcing termination of USAir citizenship proceeding). Card stated that he probably
would not have approved the transaction as it had been submitted because it would have
violated the current United States-United Kingdom bilateral aviation agreement. Id.
185. USAir and British Airways; Application of British Airways PLC for an Exemption;
Application of USAir for a Statement of Authorization to Code-share; Application of USAir for
a Statement of Authorization for a Wet Lease, D.O.T. Order No. 93-3-17, at 1, 1 (1993)
[hereinafter BA-USAir II].
186. See BA-USAir II, supranote 185, at 1 (announcing first stage of three-step investment
schedule to invest total of $750 million in USAir).
187. BA-USAir II, supranote 185, at 17-18. Transportation Secretary Federico Pefia approved
the British Airways-USAir request to permit USAir to provide aircraft and crews for British
Airways flights between London and Baltimore and London and Pittsburgh. Ziemba, supranote
29, at Ni. Secretary Pefia refused to extend this approval to flights between London and
Charlotte, North Carolina because British Airways lacks authority to serve the Charlotte market.
Id.
188. BA-USAir II, supranote 185, at 17-18.
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flights between thirty-eight U.S. cities and London. 89
British
Airways intends to invest an additional $200 million in USAir within
the next three years and another $250 million within five years."9
Thus, British Airways ultimately plans to integrate its operations with
USAir by investing a total of $750 million to acquire a forty-four
percent interest in USAir.'9 1 Although the DOT approved the first
stage of the investment, it retained the right to reconsider the
transaction after one year.1 2 The DOT indicated that it probably
will not approve the last two stages of the British Airways-USAir
transaction unless the United Kingdom enters into an Open Skies
agreement with the United States in which U.S. air carriers gain
greater access to British airports.19 3
In sum, the United States seeks to liberalize European, and
eventually global, air transport services to achieve international freemarket competition. 194 The DOT's Open Skies initiative will not
encourage significant liberalization of the international air transport
market, however, unless the United States is willing to further
liberalize its domestic market for foreign carriers.
IV.

UNITED STATES PROTECrIONIST PoLIcY

Despite its liberalization rhetoric, the United States continues to
protect its domestic air carriers from meaningful foreign investment
and foreign control, 9 5 and precludes foreign air carriers from

189. BA-USAir II, supra note 185, at 17-18; see Ziemba, supra note 29, at NI (reporting that
code-sharing agreement will permit British Airways and USAir to offer "one-time baggage check
in, one-stop shopping for reservations and fares and coordinated flight schedules" for passengers
flying between 38 U.S. cities and London). Initially, British Airways announced its intention to
begin code-sharing on May 1, 1993 for flights from Cleveland, Syracuse, and Rochester through
Philadelphia to London and beyond. Ziemba, supra note 29, at N2.
190. BA-USAir II, supranote 185, at 1.
191. BA-USAir II, supranote 185, at 1.
192. BA-USAir II, supranote 185, at 17 (granting permission for code-sharing and leasing
operations for one year).
193. Ziemba, supranote 29, at NI. The United States seeks greater access to British take-off
and landing slots. Se id.
194. See supranotes 162-63 and accompanying text (explaining that United States hopes to
initiate Open Skies negotiations with other nations).
195. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988) (defining "[c]itizen of the United States" as "a
corporation or association created or organized under the laws of the United States... in which
at least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens
of the United States"); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(3) (1988) (explaining that "air carrier" refers to
any citizen of United States that engages in air transportation); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1372 (1988)
(requiring every foreign air carrier to obtain permit from DOT before engaging in foreign air
transportation); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1988) (stating that only aircraft "owned by a
corporation ... lawfully organized and doing business under the laws of the United States" is
eligible for registration); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(a) (1988) (declaring that United States possesses
"complete and exclusive national sovereignty" over U.S. airspace, including airspace above all
inland waters, adjacent seas, or lakes over which United States has nationa jurisdiction); see also
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obtaining cabotage rights."tu
These measures prohibit foreign
influence and exclude foreign air carriers from the U.S. air transport
market. Although the National Commission to Ensure a Strong
Competitive Airline Industry'9 7 has recommended that Congress
amend the Federal Aviation Act to permit foreign investors to hold up
to forty-nine percent voting equity in U.S. airlines,'9 8 this measure
is not enough to achieve global open skies for air transport. 199
A.

Restrictions on Foreign Investment

The United States has traditionally imposed foreign investment
restrictions on infrastructure industries"°° such as broadcasting, 0 1
electric power,20 2 nuclear power,20 3 and shipping. 2 4
Congress
first enacted citizenship requirements for U.S. air carriers in the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 (Air Commerce Act) .205 The Air Commerce
Act provided that aircraft could be registered in the United States
only if owned by U.S. citizens. 2 °'
The Air Commerce Act also

infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (explaining that only U.S. citizens can control U.S.
airlines).
196. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1988) (precluding foreign air carriers from taking on
passengers at point in United States and transporting them to other points in United States).
197.

See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3 (recommending measures to

President Clinton and Congress to improve U.S. air transport industry).
198. See infra note 289 (discussing National Commission's proposal to amend U.S. foreign
investment laws).
199. See infra notes 278-98 and accompanying text (recommending measures to liberalize
U.S. air transport laws).
200. Paul S. Dempsey, The Disintegrationof the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRANSP. Lj. 9, 32-33
(1991) [hereinafter Dempsey, Disintegration] (explaining that foreign investment restrictions
reflect important role of infrastructure industries in supporting national defense).
201. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1988) (requiring that Federal Communications Commission
issue broadcasting, common carrier, aeronautical en route, or aeronautical fixed radio station
licenses only to U.S. citizens and that officers and directors of such corporations be U.S.
citizens).
202. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1988) (limiting operation of hydroelectric power plants on
navigable streams within U.S. territories to U.S. citizens or domestic corporations).
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1988) (mandating that atomic energy production licenses not
be issued to aliens or foreign-owned or foreign-controlled corporations).
204. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 883 (1988) (providing that only vessels constructed and registered
in United States and owned by U.S. citizens may engage in shipping of merchandise between
points within United States or its territories). In order to register a ship in the United States,
a corporation's principal officers must be U.S. citizens and 75% of its stock must be owned by
U.S. citizens. Id.
205. Ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568.
206. Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 568, 569. The Act defined a U.S.
citizen as:
(1) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or its possessions, or (2) a
partnership of which each member is an individual who is a citizen of the United States
or its possessions, or (3) a corporation or association ... of any State, Territory, or
possession thereof, of which the president and two-thirds or more of the board of
directors or other managing officers thereof, as the case may be, are individuals who
are citizens of the United States or its possessions and in which at least 51 per centum
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required that U.S. citizens control at least fifty-one percent of the
voting interest of any U.S. air carrier, and that the carrier's president
20 7
and at least two-thirds of its board of directors be U.S. citizens.
1.

United States foreign investment policy
a.

The Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the originaljust icationsfor
the citizenship requirement
28
Initially, Congress limited foreign investment in U.S. air carriers
primarily for national defense purposes. 2° After World War I, the
U.S. Air Force was weak and needed support from the commercial
aviation industry2 1 Congress included a citizenship requirement
in the Air Commerce Act so that the military would have access to
commercial aircraft to supplement its military fleet in the event of a
national emergency.2
Congress was concerned that foreign
investment in U.S. airlines, particularly by Germany, would pose a
threat to U.S. national defense.212 Congress feared that Germany
or other enemies would gain control of U.S. airlines and use them
against the United States as an instrument of war.
In addition,
because the Federal Government subsidized all U.S. airlines through
contracts to provide air mail service, 214 Congress wanted to ensure

of the voting interest is controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States or
its possessions.
Id. § 9(a), 44 Star. at 573.
207. Id. § 9(a), 44 Stat. at 573.
208. Cf Dempsey, Turbulence, supranote 7, at 306 (stating that governments of many nations
have controlled or protected their national air carriers because of their "important role in
facilitating communications, trade, tourism, and national pride and prestige, as they 'show the
flag' around the world").
209. Dempsey, Disintegration, supra note 200, at 40-41 (explaining that national security
considerations were primary purpose behind restrictions on many "essential infrastructure
industries," including air transportation).
210. See infra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. reliance on commercial
airlines).
211. See CIviL Ar NAVIGATiON BILL, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 26
(1925) (concluding that requirement that 75% of each U.S. air carrier be owned by U.S. citizens
ensures that aircraft will be available and in good condition for use as auxiliary U.S. air force
in times of war or other national emergencies).
212. See Inquiry into Operationsof the United States Air Services: Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. of Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Sevices, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 519, 525-27

(1925) (statement of Major General Mason M. Patrick, Chief of the Army Air Service)
(expressing concern over strength of U.S. Air Force and recognizing need to depend on
commercial airlines for additional support during war emergencies).
213. See Ellett, supra note 35, at 3-4 (explaining that fear of airplane's proven capability as
instrument of war was probable basis for restrictive national sovereignty notions of airspace).
214. See Air Mail (McNary-Watres) Act of 1930, ch. 223, § 1, 46 Stat. 259 (1930) (repealed
1934) (establishing formula to determine compensation based on amount of mail transported);
see also Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, §§ 3, 4, 5, 48 Stat. 933 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 39 U.S.C. (1988)) (authorizing Postmaster General to conduct competitive bidding
procedures to award contracts to transport mail); Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, § 4, 43 Stat. 805
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that only U.S citizens received such economic support. 215
b.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938216 modified the Air Commerce
Act by increasing the minimum percentage of U.S. citizen-held voting
21 7
equity in U.S. air carriers from fifty-one to seventy-five percent.
Although it ostensibly raised the minimum U.S. citizen ownership
standard for national security purposes,1 8 Congress further limited
foreign investment in U.S. air carriers for protectionist reasons. 219
In 1944, the Chicago Convention reaffirmed a nation's right to
establish citizenship requirements for its airlines22° and thus left the
221
U.S. citizenship requirements intact.

(authorizing Postmaster General to award airmail carriage contracts to commercial carriers).
215. Uraba, Medellin & Cent. Airways, 2 CAB. 334, 337 (1940) (stating that general intent
of Civil Aeronautics Act was to ensure that air carriers receiving U.S. economic support are
"citizens of the United States in fact, in purpose and in management").
216. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
217. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1(13), 52 Stat, at 978. The Civil Aeronautics
Act also amended the Air Commerce Act by requiring that two-thirds of the managing officers
of the corporation, in addition to two-thirds of the board of directors, be U.S. citizens. Id.
218. Id.; see also Key Airlines, Inc. Fitness Investigation, CAB. Order No. 84-4-83, at 31 n.31
(1984) (explaining that citizenship requirement was raised to 51% "because of the difficulty in
assuring control rather than mere ownership").
219. See GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETrION, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that original
intent of investment restrictions was to support heavily subsidized fledgling U.S. airline industry);
see alsoHearingson S.2 and S.1760 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. ofInterstateCommerce, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 426, 439-40, 504 (1937) (statement of Edgar S. Gorrell, President, Air Transport
Association of America) (discussing desire to keep America "out in front" of aviation industry).
220. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, arts. 17, 18, 61 Stat. at 1180, 1185, 15 U.N.T.S. at
295, 308. Article 17 provides that "[a]ircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are
registered." Id. art. 17, 61 Stat. at 1185, 15 U.N.T.S. at 308. Article 18 provides that "[ain
aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State, but its registration may be changed
from one State to another." Id. art. 18, 61 Stat. at 1185, 15 U.N.T.S. at 308. The Chicago
Convention also provided in Article 19 that "[tihe registration or transfer of registration of
aircraft in any contracting State shall be made in accordance with its laws and regulations." Id.
art. 19, 61 Stat. at 1185, 15 U.N.T.S. at 308.
Two agreements resulting from the Chicago Convention addressed airline nationality. See
International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, § 5, 59 Stat. 1693, 1694, 184
U.N.T.S. 389, 389 (reserving right of contracting states to withhold or revoke certificate or
permit to foreign air transport enterprise in any case where contracting state "is not satisfied that
substantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a contracting State....");
International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, § 6, 59 Stat. 1701, 1702-03, 171
U.N.T.S. 387, 394 (providing same right of revocation upon evidence of substantial foreign
ownership as provided in International Air Services Transit Agreement).
221. See supranotes 216-19 and accompanying text (explaining citizenship requirements for
U.S. air carriers under Civil Aeronautics Act).

1993]

LIBERALIZE OPEN SKIES

307

c.

The FederalAviation Act of 1958
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958222 further modified the citizenship provisions by requiring that a U.S. air carrier be a "citizen of the
United States. "2" Air carriers must satisfy two important criteria to
meet the U.S. citizenship requirement. First, U.S. citizens must own
seventy-five percent of the voting interest in U.S. air carriers.224
Second, in addition to enforcing compliance with the objective
numerical requirements, the CAB and the DOT have consistently
2
interpreted the law to require that U.S. citizens actually control n
U.S. air carriers. 22' The Federal Aviation Act did not elaborate on

222. Pub. L No. 85-726,72 Stat 731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988 & Supp.
11989 & Supp. H 1990)).
223. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16). Section 1301(16) defines a U.S. citizen as:
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its possessions, or (b)
a partnership of which each member is such an individual, or (c) a corporation or
association created or organized under the laws of the United States or any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States, of which the president and two-thirds or
more of the board of directors and other managing officers thereof are such
individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or
controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States or of one of its possessions.
Id. The Federal Aviation Act also governs who may operate commercial aircraft in the United
States. See id. § 1371 (requiring that "certificate of public convenience" be obtained from DOT
in order to operate aircraft within United States); id. § 1301 (3) (requiring by definition that "air
carrier" eligible for certification under § 1371 be U.S. citizen).
224. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (16) (1988); see id. app. § 1371(r) (monitoring foreign control by
requiring air carriers that undertake significant changes in their operations to provide DOT with
information relevant to their citizenship and fitness).
225. See id. app. § 1383 (providing that control may be direct or indirect for purposes of title
49).
226. Intera Arctic Servs., Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43, at 5 (1987). In this order, DOT
stated:
[F] oreign influence may be concentrated or diffuse. It need not be identified with any
particular nationality. It need not be shown to have sinister intent. It need not be

continually exercisable on a day-to-day basis. If persons other than U.S. citizens,
individually or collectively, can significantly influence the affairs of [the U.S. air

carrier], it is not a U.S. citizen ....
Id.
In Page Avjet Corp., 102 CAB. 488, 489-90 (1983), the CAB summarized its position on this
matter.
In examining the control aspect for purposes of determining citizenship, we look
beyond the bare technical requirements to see if the foreign interest has the powereither directly or indirectly-to influence the directors, officers or stockholders. We
have found control to embrace every form of control and to include negative as well
as positive influence; we have recognized that a dominating influence may be exercised
in ways other than through a vote.
Id.; see, e.g., Hutchinson Auto & Air Transp. Co., D.O.T. Order No. 91-8-15, at 10-11 (1991)
(stating that CAB and DOT historically have construed § 101(16) as requiring that U.S. citizens
control air carriers); Third-Party Enforcement Complaint of Alas de Transporte Internacional,
S.A. Against Challenge Air Cargo, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 91-4-32, at 2 n.2 (1991) (noting DOT's
policy requiring air carriers to be under actual control of U.S. citizens); Allegis Investors Group,
D.O.T. Order No. 87-7-42, at 4 (1987) (noting that meaning of control is factual matter and not

merely limited to ability to manage carrier's daily operations); Suspension of the Air Carrier
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the meaning of "control," and neither the CAB nor the DOT has
established a definition of the term. In Acquisition of Northwest Airlines
by Wings Holdings, Inc. (KLM-Northwest I),227 the DOT explained the

analysis of control as follows:
[It] has always necessarily been on a case-by-case basis, as there are
myriad potential avenues of control. The control standard is a de
facto one-we seek to discover whether a foreign interest may be in
a position to exercise actual control over the airline, i.e., whether
it will have a substantial ability to influence the carrier's activities.

228

Certificate Issued to Pride Air, Inc. Under Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act, D.O.T. Order
No. 87-5-59, at 2 (1987) (finding that 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) requires that U.S. citizens control
air carrier in order for carrier to receive certificate to engage in air transportation); Key Airlines,
Inc., Fitness Investigation, CAB. Order No. 844-83, at 11 (1984) (indicating that foreign
control test under § 101(16) encompasses potential as well as actual control); Charlotte Aircraft
Corp., 91 CAB. 1004, 1009 (1981) (stating that corporation is not U.S. citizen if controlled by
foreign national); Daetwyler d/b/a Interamerican Airfreight Co., 58 CAB. 118, 120-21 (1971)
(asserting that interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) as requiring either U.S. citizen ownership or
control would defeat congressional intent, which was to prevent foreign influence over U.S. air
carriers); Uraba, Medellin & Cent. Airways, Inc., 2 CAB. 334, 337 (1940). In Lraba, the CAB
reached the following determination:
The apparent general intent of the statute is to insure that air carriers receiving
economic support from the United States and seeking certificates of public convenience and necessity... shall be citizens of the United States in fact, in purpose, and
in management. The shadow of substantial foreign influence may not exist. While it
may be permissible to look behind the form to the substance of the management of
an air carrier to determine whether in fact, as well as in law, it is under the control of
citizens of the United States, it is also clear that the letter of the statute must be
considered and its requirement met in order to qualify as a citizen.
Uraba, 2 CAB. at 337.
227. D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51, at 4-5 (1989).
228. Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51,
at 8 (1989); see Executive Air Fleet, D.O.T. Order No. 92-9-46, at 2 (1992) (emphasizing
consistency of DOT's interpretation of § 101 (16) as requiring actual control by U.S. citizen);
Discovery Airways, D.O.T. Order No. 90-2-23, at 2 (1990) ("Each decision reflects underlying
common principles and provides guidance as to what elements may be relevant and what
corrections may be appropriate in analogous future cases."); CharlotteAircaft, 91 CAB. at 1009
(stating that foreign nationals that control corporation may be ineligible for U.S. citizen status
despite satisfaction of technical 75% standard); Silvas Air Lines, 87 CAB. 160, 162 (1980)
(indicating that questions of control will be determined based on substance of transaction
"beyond the technical requirements"); Pan American Airways, 4 CAB. 403, 405 (1943) (noting
that where word "control" is used in public utility statute without restrictions, existence of
control should be factual matter determined in accordance with statute's intent).
In Eastern-Colonial Control Case, 20 CAB. 629 (1955), the CAB provided a clear statement
of its position on the matter of control:
In ascertaining the existence of control of one company by another, it is clear that
control is an issue of fact which must be determined from a broad consideration of the
special circumstances of each case; that control may be exercised in other ways than
through a vote of the stock of the corporation sought to be controlled; that control
does not depend upon the ownership of any specific quantum of stock or other
ownership rights but rather represents the amount of power and influence necessary
to give one company actual domination or substantial influence over another, that
power over another company's stock through affiliates, through close business
associates with the same interests, or power over stockholdings exercised in combina-
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This case-by-case factual analysis ensures that the congressional
purposes of the citizenship requirement will not be defeated or
circumvented if a foreign entity undertakes a transaction that adheres
to the numerical statutory requirements but nevertheless dominates
the daily operations of a U.S. air carrier.2"
d.

The DOTs currentforeign investment policy

In its 1991 decision, Acquisition ofNorthwestAirlines by Wings Holdings,
Inc. (KLM-Northwest fl),' the DOT liberalized its foreign investment
policy by distinguishing voting equity from nonvoting equity and
debt. 3 ' The DOT decided to permit total foreign equity ownership
of a U.S. air carrier of up to forty-nine percent, provided that U.S.
citizens actually control the air carrier."2 Foreign voting equity,
however, is still limited to twenty-five percent.23 3 In dicta, the DOT
indicated that, absent loan default, it would not consider debt to be
a factor in evaluating foreign control, and suggested that a loan
agreement does not give a debt holder certain controlling rights.M
The DOT based its change in policy partly on its "reassessment of the
complexities of today's corporate and financial environment, [and]

tion with other factors bearing pressure upon the company sought to be dominated
may spell corporate control; and that, while there is no technical meaning of control
apart from that accorded the term in ordinary usage, the term "control" embraces
every form of control and may cover a wide variety of situations of fact. In short, it has
been consistently held that the term "control" is not an absolute or unqualified
concept, but rather one which involves the act or the power of direction or domination
under many and varied circumstances.
Id. at 634-35.
229. SeeDaetuylerd/b/aInterameianAirfreight Co., 58 C.A.B. at 120-21 (noting that CAB must
analyze substance over form in ownership determination, and finding that interpretation of 49
U.S.C. § 1301 (16) requiring either U.S. citizen ownership or control would defeat congressional
intent behind statute).
230. D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41, at 1 (1991).
231. Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 91-141, at 1 (1991) (permitting Wings Holdings to increase its interest in Northwest Airlines to 49%
equity ownership).
232. Id. The DOT ruled that it would not construe total foreign equity investment up to
49%, taken alone, as indicative of foreign control. Id. In addition, the DOT determined that
it would not consider debt as a factor in evaluating foreign control absent default, and provided
that the specific loan agreement at issue did not give a debt holder certain controlling rights.
Id. at 7. The DOT relaxed the 25% foreign equity limitation but Congress did not amend the
Federal Aviation Act to reflect this change in policy. Id. at 1.
233. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988) (requiring that U.S. citizens hold 75% of voting
interest in U.S. airlines).
234. Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41,
at 7. The order declared that unless "special rights... that imply foreign control are provided
to a debt holder by loan agreement, DOT do[es] not anticipate treating debt as a foreign
control issue." Id.
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a re-examination of the relationship between non-voting23 5equity/debt
and control in light of recent experience in this area."
2.

Foreign ownership and control restrictionsare unnecessary

Congress' original justifications for limiting foreign ownership and
control of U.S. air carriers are no longer valid.236 Because Congress
has virtually eliminated all subsidies to U.S. air carriers, 237 there is
no basis for concern that U.S. tax dollars will support foreign investors
that own or control domestic air carriers. Second, there are no
compelling national security reasons for limiting foreign investment in
U.S. air carriers.3 8

235,

Id.
See GAO REPORT ON AIRuNE COMPETION, stpra note 4, at 6 (stating that original
justifications for foreign investment restriction such as protecting "heavily subsidized [and]
fledgling industry" are no longer relevant).
237. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 24, 92 Stat. 1705, 1725
(1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C.S. app. § 1376(c) (1993)) (eliminating airline subsidies for carriage
of mail).
238. See KASPER, DEREGULATION, supra note 24, at 71 (suggesting that national security
considerations are overblown as justification for regulatory policies limiting foreign investment).
Even if a foreign airline or other foreign entity were to obtain control over a United States
air carrier, the effects of this transaction on U.S. national security, if necessary, should be
reviewed by the President of the United States rather than by the DOT under section 101 (16)
of the Federal Aviation Act. The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798, 798-822 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.),
which was adopted as § 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170) (West Supp.
1993), provides that the President:
may take such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend
or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States... by or with foreign persons so that such control will
not threaten to impair the national security. ...
The President may direct the
Attorney General to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district
courts of the United States in order to implement and enforce this section.
50 U.S.CA. app. § 2170(d) (West Supp. 1993). Section 2170(f) further provides:
For purposes of this section, the President or the President's designee may, taking
into account the requirements of national security, consider among other factors(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology,
materials, and other supplies and services,
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens
as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the
requirements of national security,
(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of
military goods, equipment, or technology to any country... [and]
(5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on United States
international technological leadership in areas affecting United States national
security.
Id. § 2170(t). The United States already has adequate procedures to protect against transactions
that threaten to impair national security and, therefore, does not need to impose a general ban
on foreign control of U.S. airlines.

236.
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Although the U.S. Government has utilized commercial aircraft on
a limited basis through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program
(CRAF),239 national registration requirements, rather than foreign
investment limitations, could ensure that aircraft would be available
for national defense purposes.2 ° As a condition for registration in
the United States, the DOT could require that aircraft owned or
controlled by both foreign and domestic parties be pledged under
CRAF for emergency use. If a foreign-owned or foreign-controlled air
carrier violates its CRAF agreement and refuses to provide its aircraft
and related services to the United States in a national emergency, the
Government could commandeer the nonparticipating foreign
2 41

aircraft.

239. Congress enacted the Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (1988)), which created CRAF and authorized the
President to enlist aircraft registered in the United States for national defense purposes. KASPER,
DEREGULATION, supra note 24, at 71 (noting that U.S. air carriers may pledge aircraft to
Department of Defense through CRAF). This program uses "preferential allocation of military
cargo and passenger transport business to induce voluntary commitment of aircraft and crews
for meeting emergency national security airlift requirements." Id. In return for participating
in CRAF, commercial air carriers receive military contracts for peacetime passenger and cargo
services at uniform negotiated rates based on weighted average costs plus a return on their
investment.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY AIRCRAFT:

CHANGES UNDERWAY TO

ENSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET 1, 2 (1992) [hereinafter MIL=TARY
AnCRAFT].

In 1990, for the first time in CRAF's history, President Bush enlisted commercial aircraft to
transport supplies and troops to Saudia Arabia in Operation Desert Storm. See Dempsey,
Disintegration,supra note 200, at 41 (discussing use of CRAF for military airlift in Persian Gulf
Crisis). The requirement that U.S. citizens control or own U.S. air carriers has been maintained,
in part, to ensure that air carriers that pledge aircraft to CRAF will be more amenable to
support CRAF for U.S. military or emergency situations. SeeJames Ott, Foreign Ownership of U.S.
CaniersFearedas Limit to FutureMilitay Airlifts, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 22, 1991, at
96 (noting concern of U.S. Department of Defense that relaxation of foreign ownership
limitations on air carriers will have negative effect on future CRAF participation). See generally
MIIrTARY AXRCRAFr, supra, at 1-28 (evaluating CRAF program).
240. KASPER, DEREGUI.ATION, supra note 24, at 71. Relatively few nations have national
defense commitments that require extensive airlift provisions. Id. The United States would have
substantial airlift capacity without these provisions for commercial aircraft availability. Id. The
United States can turn to the United Nations and its allies for commercial aircraft if necessary.
As the United Nations becomes more involved in global disputes, it may increasingly coordinate
the transportation of troops and supplies to various areas of the world to resolve conflicts. In
the future, it may be more important for the United Nations, rather than the United States, to
have commercial aircraft available for emergencies. Until then, however, the United States can
preserve its airlift capacity through registration requirements.
241. See TransportationDept. Considers Standardsfor RegulatingLBOs, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 11, 1989, at 128, 128 (expressing belief of some U.S. officials that any aircraft U.S.
Government needs can be taken under powers of eminent domain); see alsoAndrea Rothman
& Seth Payne, Sooner or Later,Airlines Must Learn to ly Solo, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1993, at 27, 27
(stating that laws permitting seizure of assets in wartime would help to allay national security
concerns about foreign ownership of airline carriers).
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3.

Modern justificationsfor the citizenship requirement
While national security reasons no longer necessitate limiting
foreign investment in U.S. air carriers, there may be more modem
justifications for maintaining the citizenship requirement. First, if
foreign parties own or control U.S. air carriers, the United States may
lose bargaining strength in bilateral agreement negotiations. 42 For
example, if a foreign airline gains control over a U.S. airline, this
foreign airline could essentially obtain complete access to the U.S.
aviation market. In these circumstances, the foreign airline's
government would have little incentive to grant other U.S. airlines
greater access to its own market. 243 Thus, the United States would
lose leverage in negotiating bilateral aviation agreements that are
advantageous to U.S. air carriers. Consequently, U.S. air carriers may
lose access to vital foreign markets. Second, if foreign airlines
subsidized by their governments are permitted to own or control U.S.
airlines, these foreign airlines could create unfair competition and
eventually force other U.S. airlines into bankruptcy 244 Third,
foreign investors that own or control U.S. air carriers may choose to
replace U.S. workers with foreign workers. 45
The modernjustifications for foreign investment restrictions, much
like the national security rationalizations, are unwarranted in today's
economic environment. If the United States liberalizes its foreign
investment restrictions for investors from countries that relax their
foreign investment regulations for U.S. investors, bilateral treaties may
become less important to airlines. If U.S. airlines control, are
controlled by, or are integrated with foreign airlines, such alliances
would enable these airlines to move passengers between the United
States and other nations so that access to foreign points would no
longer be a major issue in bilateral negotiations.246
Indeed,

242. See Dempsey, Disintegration,supra note 200, at 42 (indicating that foreign ownership may
jeopardize U.S. ability to negotiate bilateral agreements).
243. See GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION, supranote 4, at 6 (noting that U.S. airlines
with extensive international routes may lose competitive advantage to foreign airline that gains
control of another U.S. airline if foreign airline's government maintains restrictive bilateral
treaty with United States).
244. See Robert Kuttner, Eying in the Faceof Reason: Why the Skies Need Reregulating,BUS. WL.,
May 3, 1993, at 18, 18 (opining that most foreign carriers seeking access to U.S. markets are
subsidized, and that resulting proliferation of domestic flights in United States would add to "the
ruinous cycle of price-cutting, gouging, and bankruptcy").
245. See GAO REPORT ON AIRINE COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 7 (noting labor union
concerns about potential loss of American jobs, especially high-paying crew positions on
international flights, if foreign airlines control U.S. airlines).
246. See GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION, supranote 4, at 6 (suggesting that alliance
between airlines from two different countries would enable those carriers to link domestic and
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increased access to foreign markets would diminish the significance
of bilateral treaties negotiated by the U.S. Government. Eventually,
as the number of alliances between foreign and domestic airlines
increases, the bilateral treaty system will be recast or abandoned.24 7
An increase in foreign capital could help U.S. airlines remain
competitive in the U.S. market and could lead to increased domestic
competition. Foreign investment could provide U.S. air carriers with
an important source of capital that they need to avoid bankruptcy." As long as foreign airlines are not "substantially influenced"
by their governments, foreign airlines that invest in U.S. airlines will
not create unfair competition and force other U.S. airlines into
bankruptcy. 2 9
Rather, foreign capital would strengthen U.S.
airlines,' promote airline expansion,2 1 and secure American jobs
in the airline industry.2 2 In fact, capital from foreign airlines would
help U.S. airlines expand by creating international alliances which, in
turn, would lead to the creation of U.S. jobs. Healthier U.S. airlines
could expand their operations to more foreign destinations, which
would require more U.S. workers. Furthermore, a greater foreign
presence in the United States by a foreign carrier, linked with a U.S.
airline through the investment of capital, would create a larger flow

international routes). For example, if a U.S. airline wanted to fly to Paris from Philadelphia,
it could fly passengers to New York, switch the passengers to its affiliated French airline that
would continue to Paris and points beyond, and then split the revenues with the French airline.
247.

See GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that "some

industry analysts believe that the system of bilaterals will be replaced by a more open,
competition-oriented system").
248. See Ellett, supra note 35, at 8 (citing remarks of Timothy Pettee, vice president for
transportation research, Alliance Capital Management, at Aero Club of Washington (Jan. 29,
1991)) (explaining that current DOT foreign ownership policy does not encourage adequate
capital investment and that removing ownership restrictions would enable foreign investors to
make meaningful contribution to U.S. airline industry's capital needs); see also GAO REPORT ON
AIRINE CoMPErrrTION, supranote 4, at 6 (explaining that another way for airlines to raise capital

is through sale of equity stock and that most likely investors are foreign airlines that can
"capitalize on operating and marketing synergies" without fear of antitrust scrutiny). Weak
American airlines are unlikely to raise significant amounts of capital through U.S. equity
investors because of the low rate of returns on this stock. Unlike nonairline investors, foreign
airlines are more likely to invest in weak U.S. airlines to take advantage of an operating and
marketing alliance. Id.
249. See infratext accompanying notes 295-96 (discussing proposed "substantially influenced"
test).

250. Cf.GAO REPORT ON ARLnE COMPETITON, supra note 4, at 1 n.4 (attributing U.S.
airlines' losses in part to limited access to capital and claiming that foreign investment and
control restrictions are among primary reasons for limited capital).
251. SeeNATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting $10 billion loss in U.S.
airline industry over last 3 years and indicating that industry needs capital to enable airlines to
expand by purchasing new aircraft and extending service in international markets).
252. SeeJA Donoghue, Controlling Interests: Investing in Other Nations' Airlines, AIR TRANsp.
WORLD, Mar. 1991, at 2, 2 (stating that unions have concluded that protecting members' jobs
is more important than objecting to increases in foreign ownership).
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of passengers into the United States and lead to an increased demand
for U.S. ground services positions, which are generally held by U.S.
citizens. Greater foreign investment in U.S. airlines may also increase
competition in the U.S. air transport market by enabling U.S. air
carriers to reduce their heavy debt burdens, 253 purchase new aircraft
and equipment, 4 and avoid bankruptcy. 1 5 To encourage foreign
parties to invest capital in U.S. air carriers2 6 and to convince
nations to grant U.S. air carriers greater access to their airports,
Congress must provide the DOT with the flexibility to eliminate
restrictions on foreign investment and control."
B.
1.

CabotageRestrictions

The history of cabotage restrictions

A state's right to restrict cabotage to domestic air carriers was first
recognized in the Paris ConventionS 8 and later reaffirmed by Article
7 of the Chicago Convention. 9 The first sentence of Article 7
recognizes a nation's right to reserve for its national aircraft the
carriage of passengers, mail, or cargo transported for compensation
between two points within its "territory."26° The second sentence of

253. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that U.S. airlines have
accumulated over $35 billion of debt and predicting that this debt will keep U.S. airlines
financially weak for years).
254. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 3, at 2 (noting that U.S. laws require that
airlines purchase quieter aircraft and replace older aircraft).
255. See GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 13 (assessing potential
impact on international markets of policies that promote domestic competition).
256. See GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION, supranote 4, at 6 (indicating that foreign
airlines are not likely to invest capital in U.S. airlines unless they can exercise control over and
integrate operations with U.S. airlines); Joan M. Feldman, What Are the Chances of Foreign
Ownership of U.S. Airlines?, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Nov. 1987, at 47, 48 (noting that few investors
willingly invest significant amounts of capital in businesses that they cannot control).
257. Cf GAO REPORT ON AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 5 (suggesting that Congress
liberalize foreign investment and control restrictions in exchange for open access to foreign
airports for U.S. air carriers).
258. See Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 16, 11 L.T.N.S. at 192 (providing that signatory
nation could establish restrictions in favor of its national aircraft "in connection with the
carriage of person and goods for hire between two points in its territory").
259. Article 7 of the Chicago Convention provides:
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of
other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail and cargo carried
for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each
contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically
grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any
other State, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State.
Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 7, 61 Stat. at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
260. Chicago Convention, supranote 6, art. 7, 61 Stat. at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300. Article
2 of the Chicago Convention defines a state's territory as "the land areas and territorial waters
adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State." Id.
art. 2, 61 Stat. at 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298; see INSrITUT Du TRANSPORT AERIgN, CABOTAGE IN
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Article 7 prohibits the exclusive grant or receipt of cabotage rights to
a single nation or airline." 1 The interpretation of the second
sentence of Article 7 has created great controversy among legal
scholars. 6 ' A restrictive interpretation of Article 7 would only allow
the granting of cabotage rights on a nonexclusive basis, thus
prohibiting discriminatory grants.263 According to this interpretation, a nation that grants cabotage rights to one country would be
obligated to grant cabotage rights to other nations demanding similar
rights.2" A more liberal interpretation of Article 7, however, permits
the exclusive grant of cabotage rights if the grant does not "specifically" indicate that the cabotage rights are exclusive. 2" Thus, two
nations may agree to grant cabotage rights to each other, provided
that the agreement allows for the possibility that other nations may
receive similar cabotage rights.2"
In the Air Commerce Act, the United States first used what later
became known as the restrictive interpretation of Article 7 of the
Chicago Convention, which denied cabotage rights to all foreign air
carriers.2 67 Congress expanded the Civil Aeronautics Act by passing
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT:

HISToRICAL AND PRESENT DAY ASPECTS 9

(7-E/1969)

(hereinafter ITA STUDY] (reiterating absolute sovereignty principle regarding cabotage).
261. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 7, 61 Stat. at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
262. Douglas R. Lewis, Air Cabotage: Historicaland Modern-DayPerspectives,45J. AIR L.& COM.
1059, 1063-65 (1980) (explaining that legal scholars have postulated two interpretations of
ambiguous language).
263. Id.
264. See ITA STUDY, supra note 260, at 9 (explaining that under "rigid and restrictive"
interpretation of article 7, if country A "grants cabotage to B, not only should it be conceded
to C, D, E, etc., if they ask for it, but each of these third states has the right to demand it'); Lewis,
supra note 262, at 1063 (stating that confusion is caused by proper interpretation of words
"specifically" and "on an exclusive basis"). Lewis suggests that a restrictive interpretation of this
sentence deemphasizes the possibility that what is forbidden is only exclusive rights that are
specifically granted, and emphasizes the phrase "on an exclusive basis" so that only nonexclusive
grants of cabotage rights are allowed. Lewis, supranote 262, at 1063-64.
265. See ITA STUDY, supra note 260, at 9 (explaining "flexible or liberal" interpretation of
second sentence of article 7 and noting that this interpretation allows "State A to grant cabotage
privileges to B provided it is not stipulated that they are exclusive ... without third States having
the right to demand the same priviWegs); see also BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL Ant
TRANSPORT 314, 315 (1962) (opining that granting and receiving cabotage rights on
nonexclusive basis are clearly permitted according to Article 7 of Chicago Convention). Cheng
also suggests that granting and receiving cabotage rights on an exclusive basis seems permissible
provided that the agreement does not specify that the rights are exclusive. CHENG, supra.
266. See Lewis, sup-a note 262, at 1065 (noting that less restrictive interpretation of Article
7 emphasizes word "specifically" and deemphasizes phrase "on an exclusive basis").
267. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. 568, 572 (mandating, prior to
Chicago Convention, that navigation of foreign-registered aircraft in United States was
prohibited except as permitted by § 6 of Air Commerce Act). Section 6(c) of the Air Commerce
Act allowed the Secretary of Commerce to authorize foreign-registered aircraft to be navigated
in the United States. Air Commerce Act of 1926, § 6(c), 44 Stat. at 572. This section, however,
generally prohibited cabotage: "[n]o foreign aircraft shall engage in interstate or intrastate air
commerce." Id.; see also ITA STrDY, supranote 260, at 9 (discussing restrictive interpretation of
second sentence of article 7).
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the Federal Aviation Act in 1958, which retained the prohibition of
cabotage. 2'u
The DOT, however, can grant exceptions to the
cabotage rule for periods not exceeding thirty days in emergency
situations if the exception would serve the public interest.2 9 In
sum, because this exception is not used very often, the United States
essentially reserves cabotage rights for U.S. air carriers.
United States airlines often advocate denying cabotage rights to
foreign air carriers2 0 for the same reasons that they oppose increasing the ceiling on foreign investment in U.S. air carriers.27 ' Granting cabotage rights to foreign air carriers may impair national
security, cause U.S. airlines to lose their competitive advantage in the

The Civil Aeronautics Act amended § 6(c) of the Air Commerce Act, which failed to define
"intrastate commerce," to read that "[n]o foreign aircraft shall engage in air commerce
otherwise than between any State, Territory, or possession of the United States... and a foreign
country." Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1107(i) (5), 52 Stat. 973, 1028. Section 6(c)
of the Air Commerce Act was also amended in 1953 to correspond with the cabotage restrictions
set forth in the Chicago Convention. The new language, moved to § (6) (b), stated in pertinent
part:
Foreign civil aircraft permitted to navigate in the United States under this subsection
may be authorized by the [CAB] to engage in air commerce within the United States
except that they shall not take on at any point within the United States, persons,
property, or mail carried for compensation or hire and destined for another point
within the United States.
Act of Aug. 8, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-225, § (6) (b), 67 Stat. 489, 489.
268. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1988) (prohibiting foreign air carriers from cabotage
under § 1108(b) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended). Section 1108(b) provides in
pertinent part:
Foreign civil aircraft permitted to navigate in the United States under this subsection
may be authorized by the Board [formerly the Civil Aeronautics Board and now the
Department of Transportation] to engage in air commerce within the United States
except that they shall not take on at any point within the United States, persons,
property, or mail carried for compensation or hire and destined for another point
within the United States, unless specifically authorized under section 416(b) (7) of this
act [codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(7) (1988)] or under regulations
prescribed by the secretary authorizing United States air carriers to engage in otherwise
authorized common carriage and carriage of mail with foreign registered-aircraft under
lease or charter to them without crew.
Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. app. § 1386(b) (7) (1988) (providing that DOT can authorize foreign air
carriers to engage in cabotage in emergency situations where domestic air carriers cannot
handle traffic demands).
269. International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, §§ 12,
20, 94 Stat. 35, 39, 43 (1980) (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1386(b) (7) (1988)); see Lewis, supra
note 262, at 1073-74 (stating that exception, as applied, often serves interests of airlines and
labor organizations more than those of public).
270. SeeJeffrey M. Lenorovitz, Airline Heads Suggest MultilateralAgreements, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., June 14, 1993, at 43, 43 (noting United Airlines position, expressed by United
Airlines Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Stephen M. Wolf, that United States should not
provide foreign airlines with cabotage rights). But see American Airlines FavoursMutual Cabotage
Rights, ReutersJuly 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (favoring exchange of
cabotage rights with other countries).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 242-45 (explaining possible justifications for
restricting foreign investment in U.S. air carriers). These arguments for maintaining a ceiling
on foreign investment also support prohibiting the grant of cabotage rights to foreign airlines.
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U.S. market, push some airlines into bankruptcy, and result in the loss
of American jobs to foreigners. In today's global economic environment, however, the same policy reasons that provide a basis for the
gradual and reciprocal elimination of foreign investment restrictions
support the elimination of provisions that prevent foreign air carriers
from obtaining cabotage rightsY 2
2.

Cabotage restrictions are unnecessary

There are no longer legitimate reasons for limiting cabotage to U.S.
air carriers. National security interests do not require denying
cabotage rights to foreign carriers; these rights can be suspended in
case of emergency or war.27' Furthermore, the U.S. domestic air
transport market is well-established and highly competitive as a result
of deregulation. 274 The grant of cabotage rights to foreign air
carriers probably would not cause significant economic injury to U.S.
air carriers. 27 5 Moreover, cabotage rights for foreign airlines would

272. See supra notes 238, 246-57 and accompanying text (discussing policy arguments
suggesting that foreign investment statute is outdated); see also infra note 297 and accompanying
text (comparing effects of foreign investment and cabotage).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 236-41 (discussing reasons for eliminating foreign
investment restrictions that also support granting cabotage rights to foreign air carriers).
274. See supratext accompanying notes 253-55 (discussing potential benefits of competition).
United States airlines have become very competitive as a result of "hub and spoke" systems and
Because U.S. airlines are operating in a highly competitive
frequent-flyer programs.
environment, it is unlikely that a foreign air carrier would attempt to establish a new airline to
compete with Delta, United, and American, the three dominant U.S. airlines. It is even more
unlikely that a foreign airline would survive in the U.S. market, considering the stature of the
U.S. air carriers.
275. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that U.S. airlines have
lower costs and are more efficient than most foreign airlines); Scott Gibson & Saul Goldstein,
The Plane Truth, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1993, at C5 (comparing U.S. and European air carriers
and noting that "[t]he U.S. carriers have dramatically lower costs, a larger domestic passenger
base, greater experience running hub- and spoke-networks, and sophisticated management and
pricing systems"). "It costs Lufthansa 21.2 cents to carry a passenger one mile, and it costs
British Airways about 13.6 cents. For U.S. airlines, the figure is 9.3 cents." Gibson & Goldstein,
supra;see alsoPaul Proctor, Legalizing CabotageCould Help U.S. AirlineIndusty, Passengers,AVIATION
W. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 24, 1990, at 62, 62 (discussing likely negligible effects of granting
cabotage rights to foreign air carriers). Proctor notes:
Not all foreign carriers are interested in flying domestic U.S. routes. Those that do
primarily want to extend some of their existing U.S. services to major inland cities. A
Seoul-to-Los Angeles-to-Dallas route, for instance, would allow Korean Air Lines to offer
single-airline convenience for travelers to and from this destination, something only
U.S. carriers can provide now.
United Airlines still would enjoy the tremendous marketing advantage of sameairline flights to most U.S. markets-for example, Hong Kong-St. Louis.
Since few foreign carriers mount heavy transpacific or transatlantic schedules, the
number of foreign carrier flights actually added to U.S. airways would be minor. Many
of these would be at off-peak hours, due to the timing of the intercontinental flights
they meet or continue.
Would Singapore Airlines set up a huge hub in San Francisco and offer deepdiscount flights throughout the U.S.? I doubt it. Such a foray would be expensive and
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benefit American consumers by making available more domestic air
transport services.27 6 Finally, allowing foreign airlines to operate in
the domestic market would create American jobs because foreign air
carriers would need numerous American services to assist them in
their U.S. operations.2 77 The grant of cabotage rights to foreign air
carriers thus would serve the best interests of the United States.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

The Globalizationof Air Transportation

Airlines around the world are preparing to compete in the global
marketplace of the future. United States airlines will be unable to
survive in the future international air services market without linking
operations with foreign-based airlines. Until an unrestricted and
global common market for air services is formed, airlines from
different countries must form marketing and operating alliances to
circumvent antiquated national foreign investment and cabotage
regulations that severely restrict foreign air carriers from domestic
markets. By linking operations with a foreign air carrier, a U.S. air
carrier may gain access to foreign markets in exchange for allowing
its foreign air carrier partner access to U.S. markets.
The future of international aviation lies in regional multilateral
agreements among countries that agree to open their skies to one

meet heavy competition. Most of the airline's low-labor cost advantages would
disappear operating from a U.S. base.
Proctor, supra.
276. The option of choosing a foreign airline for domestic travel would increase domestic
competition. Increased competition would force U.S. airlines to upgrade service and lower fares
on domestic routes to avoid losing their share of the domestic market to foreign airlines. See
Bill Poling, ForeignAidfor U.S. AirlineIndustyy, TRAvELWKLY., Feb. 28, 1991, at 31, 32 (predicting
effect of granting foreign airlines cabotage rights). Poling states:
Few foreign airlines would volunteer for a bare-knuckled fight with United and
American for control of the Chicago hub. Cabotage is more likely to result in niche
marketing, and maybe a little dumping. And if foreign carriers dump cheap seats on
the deregulated U.S. market while enjoying protected markets at home, the U.S.
consumer may benefit ....
Id.
277. Proctor, supra note 275, at 62. Proctor contends:
The extension of fifth freedom flights in Asia and Europe would increase demand
at U.S. carriers for high-paying pilots and cabin and operations supervisors. The
increased flight time would require more maintenance hours and U.S.-manufactured
parts.
Foreign airlines operating in the U.S. would hire American ground crews and
reservations agents, buy U.S. fuel and rent U.S. gates.
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another's air carriers.2 78 When the international aviation market
consists of many regional alliances, the United States should convene
another Chicago Convention to change the basic nature of air
transportation regulation.
The United States should strive to
eliminate international foreign investment and cabotage restrictions2" and to replace the system of bilateral agreements with a
global and unified air transportation market in which countries can
no longer restrict access to their airports and domestic routes.2"
The DOT currently limits foreign ownership and control of U.S. air
carriers, restricting the total of voting and nonvoting equity that a
foreign party can hold in a U.S. air carrier to forty-nine percent,
provided that U.S. citizens control the air carrier. 8 1 Cabotage
rights are only available to air carriers that meet these requirements.82 Although the DOT has the authority to reinterpret the
foreign investment and cabotage restrictions of the Federal Aviation
Act on a case-by-case basis, 8 3 only Congress has the authority to
significantly amend these statutes. Congress must change, or at least
clarify, these restrictions to provide a stable environment for foreign

278. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (recommending shift in U.S.
policy away from bilateral agreement system to model "based on multi-national arrangements
that may be regionalized at first, but eventually cover the globe"); see also supra notes 123-59 and
accompanying text (explaining European Community's liberalization agreement enabling air
carriers of one member state to operate in all member states).
279. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (recommending that United
States create "multi-national operating environment for airlines free of discrimination and
restrictions").
280. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 ("The bilateral system must be
replaced with an open and comprehensive multi-national regime that has as broad a geographic
base as possible and that allows people and products to move freely and efficiently."). The
National Commission reasoned:
The current bilateral system for obtaining rights for U.S. airlines to fly to those
regions is anachronistic and badly fraying under the pressures of a global economy.
The bilateral system of aviation agreements has become increasingly contentious and
often results in agreements or relationships that are little more than exercises in zero
sum economics. It is too rigid, too time consuming and too limiting. To put it simply,
the bilateral agreement system stymies growth in the global marketplace; it does not
encourage it.
Id. The National Commission further criticized bilateral agreements by stating that "[bjecause
of our country's geographic size and population, bilateral agreements can result in the U.S.
granting foreign carriers greater access to the immense and diverse U.S. travel market without
corresponding competitive opportunities for U.S. carriers." Id. at 21.
281. See supra notes 222-35 and accompanying text (discussing DOT's current foreign
ownership and control policy).
282. See supranotes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition of cabotage for
foreign air carriers).
283. See Leveraged Buyouts and Foreign Ownershipof United States Airlines: Hearingson H.R. 3443
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 156 (1989) (statement of Samuel L Skinner, Secretary of Transportation) (stating that
current procedure for reviewing continuing citizenship status of air carriers is based on ad hoc,
case-by-case analysis).
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investors. 2s
To preserve U.S. bargaining power in the current
bilateral agreement system, Congress should not unilaterally confer to
noncitizens the right to unlimited investment in U.S. air carriers.s
These rights should be exchanged through bilateral agreements, or
ideally through a multilateral agreement, to encourage the liberalization of the international air transport market. 286 The United States
should only suspend current foreign ownership, foreign control, and
cabotage restrictions on a reciprocal basis to ensure that other
countries open their markets to U.S. investors.
B. ProposedAmendments to the FederalAviation Act and the U.S. Open
Skies Policy
Congress should amend the Federal Aviation Act and create a new
statutory framework under which the DOT could apply the Open
Skies program. 287 This proposed legislation should eliminate the
foreign voting and nonvoting equity limitations, 28 8 the foreign
control restrictions, and the provisions that prevent foreign air
carriers from obtaining cabotage rights. 8 9 Congress should, howev-

284. SeeJeffrey D. Brown, ForeignInvestment in U.S. Airlines: What Limits Should be Placed on
Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers?, 41 SYRACUSE L REV. 1269, 1288-89 (1990) (arguing that
Congress must provide legal stability and certainty to encourage foreign investors to invest in
U.S. air carriers).
285. Cf USAir ChairmanLashes Back at CrandaU,AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 18, 1992, at 485, 485
(opposing as "nonsense" position of "Big Three" that British Airways-USAir transaction should
not be approved because U.S. airlines could be injured by "unilateral giveaway" unless they get
something in return).
286. Cf. Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13, at 2 (1992) (determining to
proceed with Open Skies initiative but acknowledging that some bilateral agreements may not
"produce benefits for U.S. interests of economic value equal to those accruing to our bilateral
partners," and noting that "ifwe were to embark on negotiation initiatives only where we could
anticipate precisely equal economic benefits we would have been deterred from some of the
most successful agreements we have achieved in the last decade").
European countries, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, would probably reject a
multilateral exchange of cabotage rights and reciprocal relaxation of foreign investment
restrictions. The United States may be more successful negotiating bilateral Open Skies
agreements that include these additional liberalization measures.
287. See Ott, supranote 162, at 32 (reiterating comments by Scott Yohe, Vice President of
Government Affhirs for Delta Air Lines, concerning need for "new statutory framework").
288. To provide U.S. air carriers with badly needed capital, there should not be any limits
on the amount of nonvoting equity that a foreign entity can hold in a U.S. air carrier. Cf Card
Press Conference, supra note 180, at 3 (supporting legislation to raise statutory ceiling on
amount of airline's voting stock that could be held by foreign entities from 25% to 49%).
289. Cf. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 3, at 22 (recommending amendment to
Federal Aviation Act that enables United States to negotiate bilateral agreements permitting
foreign investors to hold maximum of 49% voting equity in U.S. airlines). The National
Commission recommended the increase in foreign voting equity as one element of a liberal
bilateral agreement that provides equivalent and reciprocal opportunities for U.S. investors. Id.
Furthermore, the National Commission stipulated that the foreign investor must not be
government owned and that the investment must advance both "the national interest and the
development of a liberal global regime for air services." Id. at 23.
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er, instruct the DOT to enforce its current policy on foreign
investment2" and cabotage291 restrictions if the following conditions are not met.
First, the United States should only permit unlimited foreign voting
and nonvoting equity investment in U.S. air carriers by foreign airlines
whose governments do not restrict U.S. ownership of their air carriers.
Although this requirement would discriminate against citizens of
protectionist countries, it would provide an incentive for individual
nations to liberalize their foreign ownership requirements.292
Under this approach, foreign equity and foreign control restrictions
would be suspended on a nation-by-nation basis through bilateral or
multilateral agreements.2 3
Second, the United States should only suspend foreign equity and
foreign control restrictions as part of the Open Skies program. To
obtain suspension of these restrictions, foreign nations would have to
incorporate the key elements of the Open Skies program 294 into a
bilateral or multilateral agreement with the United States. This

290.

See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988) (defining U.S. citizen for purposes of limiting

foreign investment). In Acquisition ofNorthwest Airlines Inc., the DOT relaxed the limit on total

equity that a foreign entity can hold in U.S. air carriers to 49%, provided that a U.S. citizen
controls the air carrier. Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T.
Order No. 91-1-41, at 1 (1991). The controlling statute, however, still mandates that foreign
ownership be limited to 25% of the air carrier's voting equity stock. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (16)
(1988). Legislative action is required to amend the statute. At a minimum, Congress should
amend this statute to reflect current DOT policy.
291. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1988) (precluding foreign air carriers from cabotage in
United States).
292.

See USAir Chairman Lashes Back at Crandal; supra note 285, at 485 (noting Delta's

position that transaction that would have given control of USAir to British Airways without
liberalization of U.S.-U.K. bilateral agreement would have been giveaway of U.S air transport
market). According to Delta, the approval of this transaction would have made it virtually
impossible for the United States to achieve its objective of liberalizing world aviation markets.
Id.
293. See American Airlines ChairmanRobert L CrandallSays Open Skies Aviation Agreement with
NetherlandsSets a DisastrousPrecedent,Bus. WIRE, Sept. 16,1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,

Business File (relaying statement of American Airlines Chairman Robert L. Crandall). Crandall
argues:
The U.S. Government must insist that U.S. carriers be granted equal access to these
beyond routes to other countries before it grants such access to the enormous U.S.
market. ... Once the foreign flag carriers have access to the U.S. market, there will
be no incentive for them or their governments to provide access to worldwide markets
for U.S. carriers.
Id.

294. In response to the question "whether each and every element must be effective
immediately and simultaneously for an open-skies relationship to exist," the DOT noted:
We accept that in some contexts the phasing in of certain aspects of our definition
might not be inconsistent with the overall notion of an open-skies regime. However,
rather than make any specific determination here, we regard this issue as one that we
can better assess on a case-by-case basis in the context of the negotiating process.
Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13, at 7 (1992).
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requirement would create an incentive for individual countries to
liberalize their air transport policies so that their nationals could
invest in U.S. air carriers.
Third, the United States should not permit airlines, individuals, or
other entities to invest in U.S. air carriers if they are "substantially
influenced" by foreign governments. 5 A "substantial influence"
test should apply on a case-by-case basis and should examine entities
that are owned, controlled, or subsidized by foreign governments. If
there is substantial government influence, the DOT's current policy
on foreign investment restrictions should apply. In addition, the
DOT should take adequate measures to prevent foreign air carriers,
especially air carriers owned, controlled, or subsidized by foreign
governments, from engaging in price dumping. 296 This policy
would prevent foreign, government-influenced air carriers, which
could obtain unfair competitive advantages, from operating within the
U.S. domestic air transport market.
Finally, the United States should exchange cabotage rights
bilaterally or multilaterally as an additional element of the Open Skies
program. The United States should only exchange cabotage rights
with nations that can satisfy the same conditions required for
suspension of foreign equity and foreign control restrictions. The
policy considerations and the effects of allowing unlimited foreign
investment and control are the same for granting cabotage rights to
foreigners.2 97 If Congress amends the foreign investment statute to
permit foreign control of U.S. air carriers, which would amount to de
facto cabotage, the approval of cabotage rights for foreign entities
298
would naturally follow.

295. See Nadine Godwin, BA's Chief. Allow Foreign Control TRAVEL WKLY., Oct. 7, 1991, at 80,
80 (quoting Sir Colin Marshall, Chairman, British Airways, Remarks at the ASTA World Travel
Congress Forum (Oct 6, 1991)) ("Dropping barriers to investment in airlines across national
frontiers is a necessary element in such an open market. ... But it goes both ways. ....
European governments will have to privatize their national carriers and let them take their
chances in the market.").
296. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373(a) (regulating tariffs
of air carriers and providing right to
reject tariff if inconsistent with this section).
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LIBERALIZE OPEN SKIES

CONCLUSION

The Paris and Chicago Conventions established the principle that
each state has absolute sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory.'
This principle led to the development of national air
carriers, which have been protected from foreign competition by their
governments.'
Initially, governments owned, controlled, or
subsidized air carriers and negotiated bilateral agreements with other
governments to exchange travel rights. The governments that
controlled the largest or most influential air transport markets,
primarily the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom, were able to control international air transport policy.
If the United States hopes to liberalize the global air transport
market, it must first permit the liberalization of its domestic market.
The current Open Skies program should provide a framework for the
reciprocal elimination of restrictions on foreign ownership, foreign
control, and cabotage rights. The United States, however, must be
willing to eliminate these restrictions in exchange for the liberalization of foreign air transport policies. A series of bilateral Open Skies
agreements might lead to another Chicago Convention, wherenations
would exchange rights on a multilateral basis to form a unified,
global, and free market for air transport.
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See supra notes 6, 35, 50 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty over airspace).
Ellett, supra note 35, at 4.

